Data insights for the future of EB-5
September 29, 2021 96 Comments
Visa availability is a key issue shaping discussion around EB-5 legislation and future potential. I have prepared a series of charts with data to help inform the discussion.
First, let’s look at who uses EB-5 visas. EB-5 gets just 7.1% of total employment-based visas, or about 10,000 visas per year. Lawmakers may assume that by making about 10,000 EB-5 visas available, they have incentivized about 10,000 EB-5 investments annually. That’s not the case. In FY2019, minor children received 41% of EB-5 visas issued, while just 36% of the quota went to EB-5 investor principals. In previous years, spouses and children received an even larger percentage of EB-5 visas. So long as the EB-5 quota must be shared between principals and their families, it can sustainably incentivize fewer than 4,000 investments annually. More investors do not fit within visa availability.

Clarifying that the @10,000 EB-5 visa quota applies to principal applicants would increase EB-5’s potential sustainable economic benefit by almost 300%. It could also reduce the EB-5 backlog by about 64%. I do not know if Congress would do this for EB-5. But certainly, an adjustment to visa allocation would be immensely and broadly beneficial — not least to the economy and job creation.
In the excitement of welcoming EB-5 investment following the economic crisis of 2008, many investors and issuers did not notice the hard limit on sustainable investor numbers created by the EB-5 quota. EB-5 investment – as reflected in I-526 filings – exceeded the sustainable level every year since 2011.

In the glory days of 2014-2017, EB-5 investment was at least three times more popular than it could afford to be under an annual visa quota of about 10,000, with only about 36% going to investors. That popularity was wonderful for the U.S. economy, which got tens of billions of dollars in investment and hundreds of thousands of jobs, but it was not good for immigration. Thanks to the mismatch between EB-5 demand potential and available EB-5 visas since 2011, EB-5 has ended up with a backlog of over 80,000 applicants still awaiting the visa incentive for their economic contributions.
I hear hopes that legislative reform could restore the EB-5 market to what it was a few years ago, such that regional centers could do business at previous levels. Look at the numbers, and think what will need to change to make that possible. EB-5 raised almost $8 billion dollars in 2015 alone, from enough investors to claim at least five years of EB-5 visas. If Congress and issuers want another $8 billion dollars a year from EB-5, they can (1) free up visas for the investors who contributed the first billions (an estimated 80K-100K visas are needed to clear the EB-5 backlog), and also (2) increase the EB-5 visa quota so that it can sustainably accommodate up to 16,000 investors a year (i.e. make the limit 3x to 4x higher than it has been). Or (3) recapture the past blissful ignorance of visa limits and backlog risk. At least two of those conditions must be met for EB-5 to possibly raise again the kind of investment that it did a few years ago. Otherwise, future expectations must be moderated. As it happens, expectations have generally been moderate for most of the EB-5 ecosystem. In 2016, DHS estimated that the average regional center project had 15 EB-5 investors, while large projects in 2016 were associated with just a few regional centers.
I highlighted per-country I-526 receipt numbers (in the years for which I have per-country data), because per-country limits also affect EB-5 visa allocation and market potential.
Under current law, EB-5 visas get allocated first to the earliest I-526 filing priority dates from each country, up to a country cap limit of about 700 visas per country. Then any leftover visas are available to the oldest priority dates regardless of origin. Country caps plus sharing visas with family means a sustainable level of just 300-400 investments per year from investors born in any one country. EB-5 demand from China vastly exceeded the per-country level several years ago (by 52x in 2015), then fell to almost nothing. EB-5 demand from China was relatively early, thus now at the head of the line for any visas leftover after organically low EB-5 demand from other countries. Here’s how per-country EB-5 visa allocation has happened so far, in practice.

Backlogged Chinese applicants – the oldest applicants and thus at the head of the line for any leftover visas — have gotten as many as over 8,000 EB-5 visas per year (back in FY2015 when EB-5 interest had not diversified), and at least over 4,300 visas per year (in FY2018 and FY2019, even after a demand increase from the rest of the world). Growing demand from Vietnam and India reached the visa stage by 2018/2019 (but not able to get visas beyond the country limit of around 700, since not near the front of the leftover visa line). All other countries combined have absorbed at most about 3,700 EB-5 visas per year so far.
The charts above have important messages for EB-5 issuers thinking about the future, and for past Chinese investors. Both should focus on the blue segment in each column – the numbers representing EB-5 visa demand from all countries below per-country limits. This number reflects market potential for EB-5 outside of backlogged countries, and is also the variable factor determining visa supply for China.
People trying to calculate future market potential may be concerned to see the “Other Countries” row hitting a plateau in I-526 filings and visa numbers since 2017, even in absence of any visa constraint. At the height of EB-5 program popularity and with the $500,000 investment level, the whole world outside China, India, and Vietnam has yielded fewer than 2,000 investors per year, and used fewer than 4,000 annual visas. Going forward, EB-5 issuers hardly want to all compete for only one to two thousand investors a year spread across miscellaneous countries — and that’s a best case assuming affordable investment levels. Issuers may be concerned to see Vietnam and India visa availability already used up for the next 7-8 years, according to Department of State estimates, and over 4,000 visas getting “leftover” every year to old applicants instead of leveraged to incentivize new investment. Thus the idea of setting aside 3,000 visas in categories reserved for new TEA applicants. With set-asides, total EB-5 market potential going forward could be not only <2,000 investors from non-backlogged countries with organically low EB-5 demand, but also another 1,000 or so investors (36% of set-aside visas) from the high-demand countries otherwise discouraged by backlog wait lines.
While the history of relatively low “Other Countries” demand is a concern for program potential, it’s an encouragement for backlogged Chinese applicants. The China visa wait time equation is China demand/leftover supply, so backlogged applicants welcome reductions to the new demand that reduces leftover supply. Wait time expectations for the China backlog will continue to improve if EB-5 demand continues to fall, as it has done since 2018/2019. China estimates will only get worse if EB-5 gets more popular than it’s ever been before in small countries. Or, if new EB-5 usage expands thanks to “TEA set-asides” providing an exclusive path around backlogs for high-demand countries. Consider the example of a past China-born investor who’s #50,000 in the queue for leftover visas. His wait time outlook changes by orders of magnitude depending on whether the 50,000-long queue before him is likely to advance at a rate of over 6,000 average annual visas available to China (the long-term average I predict, considering falling demand), or 50,000/4,000 (if rest-of-world demand stabilizes back at 2017/2018 levels), or 50,000/1,000 (if TEA set-asides divert 3,000 out of the 4,000 or so annual visas otherwise leftover to the backlog).
In light of these calculations, consider the cost/benefit of increasing total EB-5 market potential by about 1,000 investments a year via 3,000 set-aside visas for new TEA investors. Would that TEA incentive be worth the trade-off a 2x to 5x increase to backlogged Chinese investor wait time expectations? Especially when the market and incentive potential depends on finding welcome in the home of the painful backlog? And what if backlog relief (queue elimination) were proposed together with TEA set-asides (queue-jumping)? Such a combo proposal must logically presuppose that either the backlog relief provisions will fail, or the TEA incentive will be null. There’s no attraction to bypassing a painless queue.
I’ll close with a chart summarizing the current state of the EB-5 backlog (with and without derivatives), and with a slide that I made earlier this year for an AILA conference. The backlog chart reiterates how much good would result if Congress clarified that the @10,000 EB-5 visa quota applies specifically to EB-5 investors (principal applicants). The slide reflects an insight that came to me as I struggled to think through realistic EB-5 wait time predictions. “If EB-5 visa wait times are untenable, then something must give to reduce them. If not supply relief, will be demand failure.” If only legislative change can put us on the path of positive relief, and a sustainable and productive future. If that’s not possible today, let’s at least do what it takes to get reauthorization and protection for past regional center investment as soon as possible, to protect the possibility for future relief,
(For links to data sources referenced in this article, see my Timing Data Room page. For those who prefer to interact with charts in Excel, here you go. If the effort and resources that I put into these articles is worth something to you, please consider my PayPal contribution link.)




