The trouble with the EB-5 sustainment timeline (comment on IIUSA lawsuit and proposed rule, EB-5 process table)

Last week IIUSA sued USCIS over Q&A that interpret the two-year minimum investment sustainment period, disputing that the EB5 Reform and Integrity Act of 2022 (“RIA”) actually changed the EB-5 sustainment requirement. Concurrently, IIUSA petitioned USCIS for rulemaking to write a minimum five-year investment holding period into the EB-5 regulations.  This move is potentially extremely consequential for the program and for investors, and also problematic. My comment brings a perspective from EB-5 process timing.

The IIUSA litigation complaint explains why regional centers would seek government support for holding on to EB-5 funds for a minimum of five years:

97. As explained above, USCIS has long required investors to sustain their investment “over the two years of conditional residence.” 8 C.F.R. § 216.6(c)(1)(iii). This longstanding rule has incentivized regional centers to invest in high-quality projects that are more likely to generate return for investors, create the necessary number of jobs, and deliver benefits to the community at large. The practical reality is that these large-scale projects require longer investment periods, and as such the industry standard investment term for regional center-backed projects has typically been at least five years, and often longer.

The court might ask in response to this allegation: Why has the industry standard investment term “typically been at least five years, and often longer,” considering that the law and regulations have only ever name-checked “two years” when discussing the EB-5 sustainment period?

In practice, long holding periods have depended on USCIS capacity problems and visa oversubscription to insert delays in the EB-5 process around conditional permanent residence.  The CPR period is the only EB-5 immigration process stage with a firm time attached (two years); all other stages in the process can be very short or extremely long depending on agency processing capacity and workflow and visa availability. The expected EB-5 investment period can vary wildly depending on processing delay plus whether/how the investment period is contingent on immigration milestones.

EB-5 Process Stage1. Time from I-526 or I-526E petition filing to petition approval2. Wait time for visa number3. Time from I-526 or I-526E approval  or visa availability  to visa issuance4. Conditional Permanent Residence5. Time from I-829 filing to removal of conditions for permanent green card
How long is it supposed to take?<120 days for TEA or <240 days for non-TEA (target I-526 processing time set by RIA)No visa wait time so long as EB-5 usage keeps within visa supply limitsVaries depending on USCIS and DOS workload and staffingExactly 2 years by definition from admission under the EB-5 visa, with I-829 filed in the last 90 days of the period.<90 days (target I-829 processing time set by 8 U.S.C. 1186b (c)(3)(A)(ii))
How long can it take?USCIS reports median I-526 process times since 2019 of 19 to 52 months (Total time is determined by USCIS workload and staffing. Adjudication touch time per I-526 is 20.69 hours per USCIS completion rates)Visa wait time can be extremely long (10+ years), in the proportion that EB-5 applicants exceed annual visa supply.Historically around 6 months if no delay; can extend to  years in case of processing constraints.Exactly 2 years by definition from admission under the EB-5 visa, with I-829 filed in the last 90 days of the period.USCIS reports median I-829 process times since 2019 of 26 to 49 months (Total time is determined by USCIS workload staffing. Adjudication touch time per I-829 is 15.86 hours per USCIS completion rates)

If the EB-5 process functioned as Congress intended, then the EB-5 investor could complete the immigration process within three years of the time of investment. People are so used to delay that they forget to do the math. Congress set a goal of 120-240 days for the I-526E processing (per the RIA Timely Processing targets, now in 8 U.S.C. 1153 note). After I-526E approval, the investor applies for the visa that initiates a two-year conditional residence period. (This period was set at two years by the Immigration Act of 1990 “to deter immigration-related entrepreneurship fraud”). The visa application is delayed by nothing but USCIS/DOS capacity to move paperwork, schedule interviews, and approve adjustments, unless excess visa number demand forces visa number waits. After 21 months of conditional permanent residence, the investor can file I-829 to remove conditions. I-829 processing is supposed to take about 90 days (2020 Final Fee Rule: “DHS acknowledges its obligation to adjudicate Form I-829 filings within 90 days of the filing date or interview, whichever is later. See INA section 216(c)(3)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. 1186b (c)(3)(A)(ii).”) or at any rate <240 days according to the RIA Timely Processing target. So much for government intent.

Investors take longer than three years to complete the EB-5 immigration process if and when (1) processing delays occur and/or (2) EB-5 gets oversold resulting in lengthy wait times for visa numbers. Both problems have been endemic for years, such that actual immigration times have predictably exceeded five or even ten years for many EB-5 investors as noted above. That doesn’t make the immigration delay situation normal or a right, however.

Part of the outrage over the IIUSA lawsuit comes from tacit admission that the plaintiff regional centers rely on the lengthy investment holding periods underwritten by immigration delays, and fighting to keep immigration support for such economically-advantageous holding periods. If established business models rely on an immigration process lasting much longer than two years, then they depend on USCIS processing problems and visa EB-5 oversubscription. That’s the sad fact, given process facts as outlined above. What gives?  Will IIUSA sue USCIS for the progress it’s recently made toward realizing the RIA timely processing goals, because accomplishing timely processing could undermine projects that need to hold EB-5 money for much longer than the 3-year delay-free immigration process? Will IIUSA sue USCIS to conceal I-526E filing data, because such data helps avoid the visa oversubscription that can profitably inflate wait times? Will IIUSA advocate against visa relief, because lack of visa wait times would undercut profitably-long holding periods? Of course IIUSA would not consider such steps. But then why try to force lengthy holding periods specifically as an immigration necessity through litigation and rulemaking?

Immigration necessity has never been the only reason for an EB-5 investment decision. The holding period for an EB-5 investment is not simply the minimum period required by USCIS for immigration purposes – however that period may be calculated and defined — but also the time it takes a project to successfully create jobs and support an exit strategy. The promise of a five-year exit strategy is realistically more reliable than the promise of a two-year exit strategy for many types of projects, regardless of the EB-5 context. EB-5 investors have historically been willing to accept the prospect of a five year holding period as reasonable for the types of high-quality projects they want to invest in. Considering what’s practical on the investment side, projects with a two-year duration were likely not common even in the years before EB-5 processing delay. Of the 3,000+ EB-5 investments made since the EB-5 Reform and Integrity Act of 2022, I doubt many were in projects offering a two-year exit strategy, even though such projects have been technically allowable immigration-wise under USCIS interpretation of RIA. Investment holding periods around five years have indeed long been offered by regional centers and accepted by investors as reasonable to the type of investment, regardless of immigration policy.

But the general acceptability of a five-year metric does not make the IIUSA lawsuit right, or the rulemaking likely to succeed. If only a five-year holding period requirement had ever existed in law/policy, then IIUSA might sue USCIS to get it back. But it didn’t; “five years” was only ever an industry tradition. (Seeking an origin for the tradition, all I can find is Canadian government intent for the previously-popular five-year Canadian investor visa program that helped influence early industry expectations for EB-5. I blame Canada.) The only time reference for EB-5 in U.S. law or policy since 1990 was a conditional period defined as two years, though vulnerable to being deferred by processing delays and visa waits. All that IIUSA can sue to get back is a connection between that vulnerability and investor holding periods.

If the IIUSA lawsuit can convince a judge that USCIS invented its Q&A guidance, and that RIA didn’t actually decouple the required two-year EB-5 investment period from the two years of conditional permanent residence, the immediate result would be a return to holding periods indexed to however long it takes to get a visa number and start conditional permanent residence. Such a position could kill the future EB-5 market by reviving the nightmare prospect of redeployment. It could also betray the 3,000+ EB-5 investors who committed to the EB-5 program since the EB-5 Reform and Integrity Act of 2022, investing in reliance both on (1) the holding period specified in the offering, and (2) on the RIA law change, and USCIS confirmation of a minimum holding period not conditioned on immigration delay to conditional permanent residence. Why does industry wait to bring in nearly $3 billion dollars from post-RIA investors (incidentally creating the conditions for visa wait delay), then ask a court to pull the rug out from under the law/guidance that helped attract that investment, and that would protect from immigration delay?

In its statement for the public, IIUSA emphasizes that “Importantly, the purpose of this lawsuit is not to return to the previous sustainment policy that required many EB-5 investors to redeploy their capital for extended periods.” That’s good.  However, the IIUSA lawsuit does argue for the previous policy of sustainment through CPR (see for example points 20, 100, 102, and 105 in the complaint). The IIUSA strategy depends on a two-step play to (1) convince a judge that RIA did not actually change the sustainment rules, but also separately (2) convince USCIS to itself change the sustainment rules via formal notice and comment rulemaking. IIUSA suggests to USCIS a fair-looking rule that would delete the CPR link (restoring the generally likeable change that RIA arguably made) while also introducing a 5-year minimum time (thus finally aligning USCIS policy with long-standing industry tradition).

Unfortunately the IIUSA strategy could only deliver on IIUSA intent to avoid previous sustainment policy if the lawsuit fails, or if the USCIS rulemaking process is short and reliable. If the lawsuit wins and rulemaking is slow and unreliable as usual, we’ll be stuck with the old policy IIUSA doesn’t want. For historical context, here’s the timeline of the last EB-5 regulation (EB-5 Modernization): USCIS announced that it was working on an EB-5 rule in 2014 and informally invited stakeholder comments, published the draft rule in the Federal Register as a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in 2017, accepted public comments in 2017, published a Final Rule in 2019, and vacated the rule in 2021 following industry success in suing USCIS over the rule’s unfavorable content. The USCIS rulemaking process can be shorter than this, but I wonder if anyone can point to an example that took months not years. I also note that the public already provided extensive feedback to USCIS on the sustainment period following invitations to submit comments and questions for USCIS stakeholder meetings and the Ombudsman EB-5 meetings in 2023.

I suggest that plaintiff regional centers should have adopted a less perilous and tenuous strategy: education. If your projects practically need a five-year or longer holding period, then explain that to prospective EB-5 investors in economic terms, just as you’d explain to any investor. Show prospects how your offering is a better/more reliable/more profitable investment opportunity than the other guy who’s offering a shorter term, even if a shorter term is technically allowable under immigration rules. Remind investors that existing and long-standing USCIS guidance puts only a floor but no ceiling to EB-5 investment terms. The USCIS Q&A clearly says: “The INA establishes only minimum required investment timeframes for purposes of applicable eligibility requirements and does not place any upward limit on how long an investor’s capital may be retained before being returned. Regional centers or their associated new commercial enterprises can negotiate longer periods of investment directly with their investors independently of EB-5 eligibility requirements.” Point out that for investment and immigration purposes, the investment term naturally can be and must be as long as it needs to be to economically support required job creation and an exit. The economically-necessary term can plausibly be 5+ years for some if not most excellent projects, even as any promises of near-term exit strategies naturally merit extra scrutiny from investors.

What’s wrong is the attempt to claim or create an immigration necessity for lengthy investment holding periods, and try to force investor decisions in favor of long-term projects by saying that this isn’t just the economic case but what Congress and USCIS actually require for your visa. Such claims flounder for basis, reflect a shameful reliance on processing/visa delay, provoke investor outrage, and hurt the market. Program integrity will particularly suffer if the lawsuit is seen to betray the 3,000+ post-RIA investors who already committed to EB-5 before the lawsuit was filed to challenge USCIS interpretation of RIA, and now thrown into uncertainty and unforeseen exposure to visa-delay-induced redeployment risks beyond their initial agreed investment term. I am willing to believe that IIUSA leadership intended no such outcome, but what can be done to avoid it now that the lawsuit has been filed?  

Good news for I-526 and I-829 processing

And finally, I get to report good news! The Investor Program Office seems to be turning a corner with petition processing. Official results aren’t out yet for months since September 2023, but preliminary data for recent pre-RIA I-526 and I-829 completions show the continuation of an encouraging trend. We’re hearing anecdotally about timely post-RIA I-526 and I-526E adjudications as well. Kudos to USCIS Director Jaddou and IPO Chief Emmel, who promised the improvements that we’re now seeing realized. As processing volume significantly increases, processing times have a chance to come down. For detailed analysis of what’s changed behind the scenes with I-526 and I-829 processing, and implications for processing times going forward, see my article “Recovery for EB-5 processing times” guest published on the Houston EB-5 blog. I have a pipeline of articles in process for industry colleagues, and will link here as time permits for publication. I also regularly update the Processing Data page on this blog.

Sensitivity analysis for set-aside visa backlog questions

A couple weeks ago AIIA published the results of a Freedom of Information Act request showing that as of the end of 2023, at least 1,093 rural investors and 2,185 high unemployment investors had filed EB-5 petitions with USCIS. (See the AIIA post for the data and link to an extensive webinar.) Now there’s the battle of interpreting and forecasting from those numbers. What will happen when those investors from 2022/2023, together with their spouses and children, encounter visa availability that’s about 4,000 in the first year and 2,000 in subsequent years for rural, and 2,000 in the first year 1,000 in subsequent years for high unemployment (with further limits from country caps once total visa-stage demand exceeds total supply)? How bad or not-bad-at-all could the backlog situation possibly be for rural and for high unemployment set-asides, considering the scope for variation in assumptions about final visa demand and future visa supply? I think the best industry analysis so far is from IIUSA, which just put out a report by Lee Li “Calculating Demand and Supply for Reserved EB-5 Visa Numbers: Data, Factors, Knowns, Unknows, and Estimates.” I like Lee’s analysis because it doesn’t imply only one possible conclusion from the I-526E data and also doesn’t just say “there’s uncertainty in the variables” and then stop, as if implying that any uncertainty means “so don’t bother thinking about this, you can’t and shouldn’t try to account for this, there are no reasoned conclusions to be drawn, really anything could be possible, believe whatever you/I want you to believe.” Instead, Lee’s analysis models a way to take uncertainty in hand and consider a reasonable range of probability by modeling scenarios. Lee’s analysis focuses on the I-526E inventory as of the end of 2023. We can use the same approach to run scenarios for the possible situation as of today, as exacerbated by another four months of I-526E filings. (To facilitate projections, I recommend getting AIIA’s detailed report of filings by month.)

So long as I’m recommending articles, I’d also like to mention David Bier’s illuminating paper “Green Card Approval Rate Reaches Record Lows” (February 15, 2024). The article isn’t specific to EB-5, but a reminder of demand/supply imbalance issues throughout the immigration system. The charts and graphs alone are excellent and thought-provoking, and I much appreciate his analysis and conclusions.

What the Report of the Visa Office 2023 shows about unreserved EB-5 backlog status for China, India, and ROW

The Department of State has published its Report of the Visa Office 2023, including the final tally of EB-5 visas issued by country through consular processing and adjustment of status in FY2023.

The visa office report can be examined as an indicator of market interest in EB-5 visas, showing the countries of origin for EB-5 applicants in the last year, whether those applicants were already residing in the U.S. (thus adjusting status) or located abroad (getting visas through consulates), whether the applicants invested in regional center or direct projects, and whether the applicants chose Targeted Employment Area investments.  At the very end of this post, you’ll find the tables I typically make to summarize visa office report data relevant to EB-5 market demand. Spoiler: EB-5 visas are still overwhelmingly going to applicants in Asia based on investment in regional center legacy TEA projects. (In FY2023, Department of State was not able to issue any set-aside TEA visas.)

But first, I’ve prepared tables based on my primary interest: what the visa office report tells us about visa backlog status for China, India, and Rest of the World countries. For my first chart, I take FY2023 EB-5 visa issuance numbers and put them in context of the 11/2022 NVC wait list (which shows how many EB-5 applicants were registered and waiting at the National Visa Center at the start of the fiscal year), and FY2023 visa availability (which shows how many EB-5 visas could/should have been issued under numerical limits during the fiscal year).

The good news for everyone: visa issuance in FY2023 met and even slightly exceeded the EB-5 annual limit (at least for unreserved) for the first time since 2017! No unreserved EB-5 visas wasted!

Good news for India and China. DOS did not limit India to 7% of unreserved visas in FY2023, but allowed nearly 7% of total EB-5 visas. China was allocated thousands more visas in FY2023 than one might have expected given the number of “rest of the world” applicants waiting for visas. On the other hand, Chinese and Indians should note the difference between applicants who were registered at NVC in late 2022, and consular visas issued in 2023. The difference equals the number of applicants who were already waiting in 2022 and apparently still waiting a year later: a difference that gives a reality check for interpreting the visa bulletin. Realizing that 731 Indians who registered at NVC in 2022 or earlier still didn’t have visas in late 2023, we know that the inventory of pre-2020 Indian priority dates can’t be clear, regardless of visa bulletin dates, unless denial rates were extremely high. I’ll be interested to see the NVC wait list as of 11/2023, which should be published shortly.

I’m most concerned looking at the visa issuance numbers for countries other than China and India, which are not limited by country caps and yet left many applicants behind. (As DOS clarified in 2023, country caps only limit the short list of countries that exceed 7% across all EB+FB categories. China and India are the only countries that are both high demand in EB-5 and also high demand across all visa categories. But countries without the individual 7% limit can still run up against constraints.) Of the more than 5,000 Rest of World EB-5 applicants registered at the National Visa Center in late 2022, over 3,000 didn’t get visas in FY2023. Those applicants weren’t constrained by anything in FY2023 except consular capacity to schedule interviews; technically 3,000 visas could have gone to them in FY2023 instead of being considered “otherwise unused” and assigned to China over China’s country cap. (Unless denials account for a significant part of the gap, but the consular EB-5 denial rate is historically not very high — averaging 9% in 2016-2021.) DOS apparently left many ROW applicants to wait in a small backlog, which I foresee is about to become a large backlog as USCIS is finally aggressively approving I-526 and advancing thousands more ROW applicants to the visa stage. (Another post on this coming soon – the latest I-526 and I-829 processing numbers are excellent.) Backlogs can be a wait time issue even for countries not subject to country caps, as you know by looking at any visa bulletin and seeing the final action dates for ROW in EB-2, EB-3, and EB-4. The backlog tipping point in EB-5 for “rest of the world” countries will come when ROW applicants for unreserved visas collectively exceed 86% of unreserved visas available – i.e. when ROW unreserved reaches about 6,000 applicants. (Logic: Chinese and Indian unreserved applicants have older priority dates than most ROW applicants, so Chinese and Indians will get allocated EB-5 visas first up to the 7% cap for each country, collectively claiming 14% of visas. So more recent ROW applicants collectively can’t be allocated more than 86% of visas in a year, and any ROW applicants exceeding that threshold will be cut off by the visa bulletin and have to wait for visa availability in a future year.)

I went on to make a table showing the multi-year trend in visa availability, demand, and issuance for China, India, and ROW. The table highlights the tragedy of 2020-2022, when COVID-19 followed by the nearly year-long regional center program shutdown resulted in the loss of 25,880 EB-5 visas. The table illustrates that processing capacity for ROW visa issuance has been a long-term problem, with consulates regularly issuing thousands fewer visas than available to and demanded by ROW. On the other hand, this problem for ROW has been a boon to applicants from China, whose numbers depend on the number of visas leftover from ROW (except in 2020-2022, when China’s numbers sadly depended on a closed consulate and closed regional center program).

In thinking about supply and demand for unreserved visas, we want to not only look at what’s been happening at the visa stage, but also visualize what’s coming down the pipeline as more I-526 get approved. The following table shows the steps I take to estimate the total pipeline demand for unreserved visas as of the end of 2023. Note that this table only estimates demand from pre-RIA investors. Any post-RIA investors who go for unreserved visas will be placed – based on priority date order – at the end of the pre-RIA queues. In other words, my estimate of the existing unreserved visa pipeline suggests that a post-RIA applicant for an unreserved visa would find himself #40,000+ in the China unreserved queue, #5,000+ in the India unreserved queue, or #15,000+ in the Rest of World unreserved queue. Not the place to be, with only 6,800+ total unreserved visas available annually! We’re concerned to see the set-aside queues filling up, because there’s obviously no room for spill-over into the unreserved category.

Calculation StepsPre-RIA Unreserved Visa Demand EstimateChina UnreservedIndia UnreservedROW UnreservedTotal UnreservedNote
AI-485 pending as of 10/1/20227362348931,864Total is actual; per-country is a guess considering visa issuance
BNVC wait list as of 11/202238,8741,3625,26245,498Actual
ChinaIndiaROW 
 CConsular visas Issued FY235,6848151,8558,354Actual
 DAOS visas issued FY235781847011,463Actual
E=C+DTotal Visas Issued 20236,2628152,7409,817Actual
ChinaIndiaROW 
F=B-CPeople waiting at NVC in 11/22 still waiting in 11/2333,1905473,40737,144Actual
G=A-DI-485 pending as of 11/22 still pending as of 11/2315850192401Total is actual; per-country is estimate
ChinaIndiaROW 
HEstimated new visa applicants in 2023 from I-526 approvals in 20231,0001,5004,1006,600Estimate from I-526 approvals in 2023 (world is actual, per-country is guess based on known per-country inventory as of 3/2022 and PD of I-526 approvals in 23), assumes 2.5 visas per approval
IEstimated future visa applicants from pre-RIA I-526 currently still pending as of 11/20236,0003,0008,00017,000Estimate from pending inventory (world is known, per-country is guess based on known per-country); estimate 2 visa demand per pending I-526
ChinaIndiaROW 
J=F+G+H+ICONCLUSION: Estimated total pre-RIA unreserved visa pipeline as of 11/202340,3485,09715,69961,145 
IVisa pipeline at I-526 stage as of 11/2023                   6,000                    3,000                    8,000           17,000 
F+G+HVisa pipeline at visa stage as of 11/2023                 34,348                    2,097                    7,699           44,145 

And finally, tables summarizing market-relevant data from the Report of the Visa Office 2023.

Update on I-526 and I-526E filings to 11/2023 (pipeline demand for rural and HU visas)

See “AIIA FOIA Series: Updated I-526E Inventory Statistics for 2023” (February 29, 2024) for another important update on pipeline demand for rural and high unemployment set-aside visas. I helped make the charts for this article, and encourage everyone concerned about potential backlogs and wait times to read the article, donate to AIIA (so they can keep doing this!), get the Excel from AIIA with all the details, and work on your own analysis. (Shout-out to Matt Galati, who donated his formidable litigation skills to pushing the data request through the FOIA process.)

I don’t have time at the moment to write in detail about what I see, and in any case I advise that you start by grappling with the facts yourself. Then you’ll be prepared to interpret the variety of motivated/limited conclusions that you will hear from others. EB-5 supply/demand and timing analysis is complicated in detail but basically simple: demand > supply = backlogs and wait times. And so we try to track demand.

The data we can get from USCIS — a count of I-526 and I-526E receipts by petitioner country of origin and TEA category — is not an exact predictor of future visa demand. But it’s extremely useful to know, at least, how many investors have entered the queues for rural and high unemployment visas, even as we have to guess about factors such as queue speed through USCIS processing, denial rates, family sizes at the visa stage, and pace of incoming demand since the last report. (I refer to the new queues as “pipeline demand” for rural and high unemployment visas, because so far it is still mostly just in the pipeline, not at the visa stage. I watch the Department of State monthly visa issuance reports, and no set-aside visas had been issued by consulates yet at least up to last report for January 2024.)

A note on dates: it’s a little hard to tell how many months are fully accounted for in the latest FOIA response. USCIS sent AIIA a table with rows through January 2024, but entered just a few numbers in the rows for recent months. Unless people almost stopped filing petitions over the winter, I guess that the latest FOIA request gives data that’s complete through at least October 2023, only partially counted for December and January, and maybe partially counted for November. (If only USCIS had better systems, and could just print reports without so much struggle and fuss! As it is, I suspect that these FOIA responses require someone going to the warehouse and shuffling through paper to make a tally.) But even if we only look at the I-526 inventory accumulated up to November 2023, there’s already a significant message about demand versus future supply of EB-5 visas.

FY2023 Q4 EB-5 Form Data Report (I-526, I-526E, I-829, I-956, I-956F)

USCIS has updated the Immigration and Citizenship Data page with reports for forms filed and processed through FY2023 Q4 (the year and quarter ending September 30, 2023). For EB-5 numbers, I look at All USCIS Application and Petition Form Types (Fiscal Year 2023, Quarter 4) (PDF, 183.88 KB), the California Service Center numbers at Application for Adjustment of Status (Form I-485) Quarterly Report (Fiscal Year 2023, Quarter 4) (PDF, 337.2 KB) and Form I-140, I-360, I-526 Approved EB Petitions Awaiting Visa Final Priority Dates (Fiscal Year 2023, Quarter 4) (PDF, 121.52 KB). I enter the quarterly numbers in my spreadsheets and compare against previous reports to identify trends and answer questions.

My top questions when I look at new EB-5 data: what’s the latest news on pipeline demand for post-RIA visa numbers? How many regional center projects are on the table, and what progress is USCIS making in adjudicating project applications and investor petitions? Are processing volumes increasing or decreasing for pre-RIA and post-RIA forms? What’s the latest news on I-956 and I-956F processing times?

Trend for I-526 and I-526E receipts

Are post-RIA investor petition numbers continuing to climb? How does incoming and cumulative demand look when compared against set-aside visa availability?

Answer from Q4 data: The linear upward trend continued, for a cumulative total of over 2,600 post-RIA I-526 and I-526E filed as of September 30, 2023. (The figure could be nearly 3,000 if one sums quarterly receipt numbers instead of believing the period-end pending and processed numbers.)

If we assume a visas-to-investor ratio of at least 2-to-1 (thinking about family sizes and denials), then 2,600 petitions filed translates into potential demand for at least 5,200 post-RIA visas accumulated in the pipeline as of September 2023. If we guess that filings in Q3 and Q4 continued the previous category breakdown (known from AIIA’s FOIA request of data through Q2) of 23% rural and 70% high unemployment, that would likely mean at least 1,200 pipeline rural applicants and at least 3,600 pipeline high unemployment applicants accumulated by September. If we guess that demand since April moved 100% to rural (the unlikely worst-case scenario for rural and best-case scenario for HU), that could mean at least 4,000 rural and 2,000 HU visa demand in the pipeline by September 2023. The pipeline — continuing to grow as I-526E continue to come in — is headed toward visa availability of about 4,000 rural/2,000 high unemployment in the first year, and about 2,000 rural/1,000 high unemployment in subsequent years. Important considerations for people wondering about future visa wait times that are a function of visa demand exceeding visa supply.

I-526E filings show strong demand to invest in the U.S. and support U.S. job creation; we need visa numbers sufficient to support and sustain that potential. An important advocacy focus for the EB-5 industry, as we face 2024 and beyond.

I-956 and I-956F Volume and Processing Times

How many projects are potentially out in the market raising EB-5 capital, and how many have been reviewed by USCIS? How many regional centers has USCIS reviewed for compliance under RIA?

Answer from Q4 data: USCIS reports a total 12 I-956F project applications processed in FY2023, and 231 I-956F project applications still pending at year-end. In other words, USCIS had reviewed only 5% of the total projects potentially out raising funds. However, I have personally heard about many I-956F approvals in December 2023, so hopefully the next quarterly I-956F report will look better. And I’m happy to see that USCIS has reviewed at least 148 (nearly 40%) of the 379 I-956 regional center applications filed through September. For whatever reason, USCIS is not disclosing denial rates for either I-956 or I-956F – only reporting on total forms processed. The median processing time looks good for the few forms that did manage to get processed – 9 months for I-956 and 12.8 months for I-956F. (This is a nice reference for applicants whose forms that didn’t get processed yet, and who may want to file Mandamus actions.)

from Processing Data Report for FY2023 Q4 (July 1, 2023 to September 30, 2023)

FormFY2023 ReceivedFY2023 ApprovedFY2023 DeniedFY2023 Total ProcessedFY2023 Q4 PendingFY2023 Q4 Processing Time
I-956274 H D1482319
I-956F185 H D1223112.8
I-956G313 –   –   –  256 N/A
I-956H2,350 –   –   –  3,188 N/A
I-956K644 –   –   –  579 N/A

Post-RIA I-526E processing

How is USCIS doing on advancing post-RIA applicants to the visa stage by approving I-526E investor petitions?

Answer from Q4 data: I-526E processing data appears for the first time on the Q4 report, which records 63 I-526E approvals (no denials) both for FY2023 Q4 and the full year. If all 63 investors whose I-526E were approved in FY2023 Q4 can manage to get a FY2024 visa, that’s about 120 to 240 post-RIA visas. Not near the thousands of carryover visas available on a use-it-or-lose-it basis to set-aside categories in FY2024, but much better than nothing!

Pre-RIA I-526 and I-829 Processing

What’s happened to pre-RIA petition processing as USCIS also tries to accommodate the post-RIA workload? Are we anywhere near digging out of the processing collapse that started in 2019? How long will it take to clear the current I-526 and I-829 backlog, if recent processing volume continues?

Answer from Q4 data: USCIS has not abandoned pre-RIA petitions, and obviously made extra effort to improve I-526 and I-829 volumes for the fiscal year-end. There’s been a fairly consistent improvement trend since the rock bottom of 2021, which is great to see. But in a wider context, the best efforts of FY2023 Q4 are still only barely as good as mid-Pandemic processing volume, and still three times lower than the I-526 volumes USCIS was achieving prior to 2019. FY2023 ended with just under 10,000 I-526 and 10,000 I-829 pending. You do the math for how long it would take to clear that inventory if USCIS continues to adjudicate at a rate of 1,300 I-526 and 800 I-829 per quarter. The Investor Program Office must continue to ramp up its efforts (not slack off, as we’ve seen so far in the months since September).

People at the back of the inventory for I-526 and I-829 processing need not necessarily despair about their processing times, however, because processing is not close to FIFO. I know from other sources that USCIS has recently primarily been processing I-526 filed in November 2019 – nearly the end of the I-526 queue – and has been approving many I-829 filed in 2020, 2021, 2022, and even 2023, even as the median I-829 processing time reflects cases filed in 2019. See the charts below and on my regularly-updated Processing Data page the processing distribution of recent I-526 and I-829 approvals.

The I-526 denial rate continues to appear very high (37%); however, I have inside information that more than half of the decisions reported in the I-526 denial category in Q4 were actually voluntary withdrawals. The I-829 denial rate was 15% in Q4 — slightly higher than average. USCIS has reported no I-526E denials yet.

And finally, a note for anyone who benefits from my data reports that you are welcome to help make all this work worthwhile with a Paypal contribution. Happy New Year!

from Processing Data Report for FY2023 Q4 (July 1, 2023 to September 30, 2023)

FormReceivedApprovedDeniedTotal ProcessedPendingProcessing Time
I-526 (Pre-RIA) –  8144771,2919,52750.5
I-52657 –   –   –  182 N/A
I-526E88863 –  632,431 N/A
I-8292406711177889,98952.7

Running ahead in the January 2024 Visa Bulletin

The January 2024 Visa Bulletin has holiday cheer for some EB-5 applicants, with final action date movement for Unreserved EB-5 to December 8, 2015 for China and to December 1, 2020 for India. I read this move as good news for all Chinese with pre-12/8/2015 priority dates, a lucky break or at least a nail-biting possibility for the 1,000 Indians with pre-12/2020 priority dates who fortuitously happen to be closest to visa interview/I-485 adjudication right now, and a blow to the 2,000+ Indians with pre-12/2020 priority dates who will watch others get visas while they remain mired in slow I-526 and visa processing.

I interpret visa bulletin movement against the background of I-526 filings by month, because that’s what VB dates represent: priority dates from people who started the process by filing I-526, and now signaled by filing date at the visa stage. When the VB moves final action dates from Date A to Date B to Date C, I count up the I-526 filed between those dates, look at visas issued and available, and think. (To assist everyone else in the same exercise, here’s my Excel with the needed data and example analysis.)

One could assume that a visa bulletin Final Action move from Date B to Date C means “Department of State must have finished issuing visas to priority dates between A and B, and must expect everyone  between B and C to get visas shortly.” With regard to the dates for filing, one assumption is “DOS must expect that the current filing date will become the final action date within a year.” To check those assumptions, I consult I-526 filing numbers. The interpretations are reasonable if expected visa applicants (I-526 principals less denials plus family) are plausibly consistent with recent visas issued and/or near-term visas available. If not, then we consider the alternate possible interpretation of visa bulletin movement: “A lot of people between Date A and Date C must be tied up in slow I-526 processing, and reaching the visa stage out of priority date order, with the result that some but not all priority dates up to C are documentarily qualified and may get visas shortly, while Date C will retrogress when the remaining applicants in those dates eventually become qualified. Meanwhile, the filing date must have been set to stimulate more qualified applicants but unlikely to become the final action date any time soon, considering how many applicants in the pipeline would qualify within the filing date movement.”

About 1,600 Indians filed I-526 between December 2018 and December 2020 (the India Visa Bulletin movement this year), and about 3,000 Chinese filed I-526 between October 1 and December 8, 2015 (the China VB movement). Adding assumptions about denial rates and family sizes, that could generate about 3,000 Indian visa applicants and at least 4,000 Chinese applicants. FY2024 has about 1,000 EB-5 unreserved visas available to India, and possibly up to 9,000 available to China. Against this background, it’s plausible that every Chinese with a pre-12/8/2015 priority date who still wants an EB-5 visa might possibly get one in FY2024. For India, evidently less than half of pre-12/1/2020 priority dates could possibly fit into this year’s visa availability, even if DOS had already cleared the backlog of pre-12/1/2018 Indian priority dates (which it can’t have done, considering the previous NVC waiting list and visa issuance, and dates on still-pending I-526). The difference between China and India is backlog location. Chinese with priority dates before 2016 are nearly all out of I-526 processing and thus on the visa bulletin radar, while many Indians with priority dates in 2019 and 2020 are still awaiting I-526 adjudication or not yet documentarily qualified (and thus not yet possible for the visa bulletin to consider).

If I’m an Indian with a November 2019 EB-5 priority date (one of the 745 Indians who filed I-526 in November 2019), how likely am I to get a visa this year? It depends on whether I happen to be already documentarily qualified at the visa stage now, and on I-526 processing volume and order for other Indians. Resorting again to a transit analogy, it’s like being passenger #20 on the standby list for a flight with 10 seats remaining to be allocated. If all 20 standby passengers were at the gate ready to board, I’d have no hope. But let’s say that only five passengers are at the gate, while the rest are caught up in traffic and security screening lines or decided to stay home or catch another flight.  The five already at the gate have a chance for seat assignment just because they’re on the spot, regardless of list priority – provided that not too many others on the list can eventually make it through security and come sprinting down the concourse in time to claim seats before the flight has to depart. There’s even some hope for the passenger #20 still currently stuck in security screening – if only he can count on unfair queue times advancing him while holding others back, such that only he and four other passengers will reach the gate in time for seat assignment. The situation can play out this way in EB-5, as low-volume and non-FIFO I-526 processing advances Indians to the visa stage in dribs and drabs, and out of priority date order, so that visa allocation can come joyfully earlier for some and sadly later for others than a FIFO calculation would anticipate. Meanwhile, the EB-5 context also has analogues to standby passengers who end up just staying home (giving up on immigration) or catching another flight (e.g. EB-1 or EB-2), thus relieving wait times for those who persist in trying to catch an EB-5 visa.

As further background and material for prediction, here is my estimate of the current size and location of the pipeline for unreserved EB-5 visas (assuming an average two visa applicants resulting from pending I-526, and guessing about country distribution of I-526 adjudicated since last year). I’ll be able to update the estimate once Department of State updates the NVC waiting list, and USCIS publishes more recent I-526 approval numbers.

Analyzing the demand/supply balance for rural and high unemployment set-aside visas

EB-5 is an investor visa program. The promise of visa eligibility is what attracts an EB-5 investment, and visas are subject to numerical limits. EB-5 has nothing to sell beyond those limits except empty promises, so we have strong reason to track pipeline visa demand and inventory.

Like promoters for a general admission stadium concert, regional centers and issuers should know the number of seats in the stadium (EB-5 visas available) and number of tickets already sold for each section (I-526 filed by visa category). EB-5 inventory tracking is stressful considering multiple parties offering tickets, small supply, enthusiastic demand that’s historically exceeded stadium capacity, and a government that resists disclosing the status of ticket sales. But we do our best, because self-interest depends on it. I don’t only care to avoid the fraud of investor visa offerings without visas. I want to assess potential market size and predict how long EB-5 business can last.

The best post-RIA EB-5 inventory intel to date is from an AIIA Freedom of Information Act request, which got data for I-526 and I-526E filings through April 2023, itemized by TEA category and investor country. I previously linked to AIIA’s article on the data, and the AIIA member webinar was published today on Youtube for anyone to watch.  I recommend the webinar for a good collection of data slides, and for discussion by a panel including yours truly, Halston Chavez (Galati Law), Joseph Barnett (WR Immigration) and Charles Oppenheim (formerly of the Visa Control Office at Department of State, now at WR Immigration). We talked about translating I-526 receipt numbers into visa demand calculations, and analyzed supply factors including how carryovers and country caps work. The webinar is a great chance to hear from experts who approached the topic from different angles and without trying to sell anything or feed a message, just aiming to empower listeners. Thanks to AIIA for organizing, and to Galati Law for helping to obtain the data from USCIS.

This post is another attempt at the tough task of simplifying/explaining a complex picture. Table 1 summarizes the FOIA data, and Table 2 offers a big-picture visa supply/demand comparison. The headline: pipeline demand for the high unemployment set-aside category was already entering backlog territory as of April 2023, the rural category had some demand but still well below foreseeable visa supply, and the infrastructure category remained untouched.

Table 1. Number of I-526 and I-526E filed April 1, 2022 to April 30, 2023, by TEA Category and Country of Chargeability (summarized from data in the USCIS response to FOIA request by AIIA)

CategoryChinaIndiaRest of WorldTotal% Total
Rural247577337724%
High Unemployment4291804811,09069%
Infrastructure0%
Not TEA2315751137%
Rural and High Unemployment2350%
Total7012526321,585100%
% Total44%16%40%100%

Table 2. Estimated Pipeline Demand for High Unemployment and Rural Visas Compared with Supply

AB≈A*2CDE
Input Fact: Total HU I-526 filings up to 4/30/2023 (mostly filed 9/2022-4/2023)Estimated pipeline HU visa demand as of 4/30/2023 (if visa demand I-526*2.0 )Estimated allocation of HU Visa Supply by CountryApproximate HU Visa Supply in Carryover Year 1Approximate HU Visa Supply Without Carryover
Total1,0902,180Total2,0001,000
China429858Minimum 7%140+70+
India180360Minimum 7%140+70+
Rest of world481962Maximum 86%1,720860
Input Fact: Total Rural I-526 filings up to 4/30/2023 (mostly filed 9/2022-4/2023)Estimated pipeline rural visa demand as of 4/30/2023 (if visa demand ≈ I-526*2.0 )Estimated allocation of Rural Visa Supply by CountryApproximate Rural Visa Supply in Carryover Year 1Approximate Rural Visa Supply Without Carryover
Total377754Total4,000             2,000
China247494Minimum 7%280+                140+
India57114Minimum 7%280+                140+
Rest of world73146Maximum 86%3,440             1,720

Summary of conclusions from Table 2 estimates:

  • Table 2 is designed to facilitate big-picture/ballpark estimates of how close we were as of April 30, 2023 to maxing out visa availability in EB-5 set-aside categories. Column B gives a pipeline visa demand estimate calculated from I-526 filings, while Columns D and E show approximate annual visa supply.
  • When I look at Table 2, I first look at the totals in B and D. When Total D > Total B in a category, then we’re not looking at backlog risk for the first tranche of Chinese or Indian applicants in that category. If Total D < Total B, then I start looking down at country-specific supply/demand numbers and thinking about backlogs/wait times. Column D represents a year fattened with carryover visa supply; once the first tranche of applicants absorbs those visas, subsequent years (Column E) will have half the supply and even greater backlog risk.
  • The Rural category was looking good as of April 2023, with over 4 visas available in a carryover year and over 2 visas available in a normal year for every one applicant estimated to be in the pipeline at that time.
  • The High Unemployment category appears already approaching the danger zone as of April 2023, with total pipeline visa demand sufficient to exceed total annual supply even in a year with extra carryover visas. That level of demand would be twice available supply in a normal year, and place China and India far beyond their assured visa supply under country caps. Relatively high “rest of the world” demand represents a limit on the number of visas that could be left unused (i.e. available for China/India), and also a signal that even Rest of World could exceed visa availability and face wait times. I could see the existing high unemployment set-aside backlog risk being averted if I-526E denial rates prove very high (which could well happen if a few big projects get rejected), if a significant number of people who filed for the high unemployment set-aside are actually issued an unreserved visa (which could possibly happen as a result of multiple classifications on approvals), or if it turns out that demand for high unemployment set-aside investments tanked after April 2023. Absent widespread denials or diversions, however, the market for high unemployment set-asides (especially from Chinese and Indians) can’t afford to continue at the rate exhibited up to April 2023.
  • Table 2 gives a pipeline demand estimate as of April 30, 2023 based on about eight months of I-526 filings. To estimate where we are today, about eight months later, you could more or less double the figures in Column A and B — depending on whether you guess that demand for each category has been more or less brisk through the end of this year. The following are notes on the numbers and assumptions in Table 2, column by column, and examples of how to use Table 2 for calculation.

Column A: I-526 input

  • The input fact in Table 2 is total number of I-526 and I-526E filings for set-aside categories from when the set-aside categories become available in 2022 up through April 2023. USCIS reported the categories checked by petitioners on Form I-526 and I-526E. The classification assigned by USCIS on approval, which is what really matters for the visa, may vary.  (USCIS might not approve the requested TEA, or might choose to approve the I-526E in more than one visa category.)
  • The data AIIA received is monthly, and indicates an fairly even volume of receipts September 2022 to April 2023. If you guess similar volumes after April, then double the numbers in Column A to ballpark estimate totals as of today. Or if you sense that the investment/filing pace picked up or slowed down after April 2023, for rural and/or high unemployment categories, then adjust the multiplier accordingly to estimate total filings as of today. (AIIA has already filed an updated FOIA for more recent data, but pending response we have to guess.)

Column B: visa pipeline demand estimate

  • The pipeline visa demand estimate comes from estimating how many successful visa applications will result from I-526/I-526E filings by investors. This estimate considers the fact that not every petition/application will be approved, and that the investors counted on I-526 will later be joined by family members at the visa stage. I tend to multiply I-526 receipts by 2 for a rough estimate — for simplicity and assuming a 25% denial/attrition rate and average family size of 2.8. Those numbers are basically consistent with EB-5 history, but use a smaller or larger multiplier if you guess that future denial/attrition rates or actual average family size will be higher or lower.
  • I call the Column B estimate “pipeline” visa demand because these people are nearly all awaiting petition processing at USCIS, and thus not visa applicants yet. But they are in the pipeline queue. The high unemployment applicant with May 1, 2023 priority date could look at the total in Column B as the estimated size of the queue ahead. If people associated with priority dates up to April 30 will claim 2,180 visas, then the May 1 applicant would wait for the 2,181th high unemployment visa.  If another 2,000 high unemployment applicants have come in since April 30, then today’s high unemployment investor would expect to wait for over 4,000 other applicants to claim high unemployment visas in advance of him. (The reality is more complicated because country cap limits eventually trump priority date order, but this is the general idea.)

Column C: Visa supply allocation

  • So long as total supply for high unemployment visas exceeds total qualified demand, there’s no need for traffic control, and the visa bulletin and country caps don’t get involved. In a low-demand scenario, available visas simply get issued in priority date order to those ready to take them, regardless of country. In a year with fewer than 800 total applicants for over 4,000 total visas available, all applicants could expect a visa regardless of country of origin. On the other hand, if a year has 2,200 applicants vying for 2,000 visas, then the visa bulletin will activate to hold back 200 applicants. And the first applicants to be held back will be from countries exceeding the country cap.
  • Of the country-cap limited countries (named in every Visa Bulletin Section A.3, usually and currently “CHINA-mainland born, INDIA, MEXICO, and PHILIPPINES”), only China and India also have high EB-5 demand, which is why I itemize only those countries in Tables 1 and 2. Vietnam, South Korea, and Taiwan are other countries with relatively high EB-5 demand, but the visa bulletin does not apply country caps to them because their total demand across EB+FB categories is not excessive. (As a reminder for how country caps work within categories and to whom they apply, review Section A in any Visa Bulletin, the EB-4 Federal Register explanation, this handy slide visual from the AIIA webinar, and Charles Oppenheim’s explanation from the AIIA webinar. Vietnam is a marginal case because it has appeared on the visa bulletin A.3 list in the past, starting in 2018, but it hasn’t been listed since 2021. China and India, on the other hand, have consistently been excess demand countries on the visa bulletin list every year since 2005.)
  • When qualified visa demand exceeds supply, then people from country-cap-limited countries get limited to 7% of available visas plus whatever is left after rest-of-world demand. 7% is not a ceiling for China or India – it’s a baseline that can be increased to the extent that visa demand outside those two countries takes less than 86% of category supply that year. For example, what if the estimated high unemployment applicants in Table 2 Column B (2,180 total, 858 Chinese, 360 Indians, 962 Rest of World), were all qualified together in a year with 2,000 visa available. How many visas would be issued to Chinese that year? My best guess would be about 730, calculated as 140 (7% of supply) plus a share the difference between 1,700 ROW visas available and 962 ROW visas demanded.  Chinese and Indian applicants should pay attention to the Rest of World demand number even more than the 7% supply number, because ROW demand is what ultimately constrains the visa availability for China/India.  
  • Can countries unlimited by the 7% country cap still potentially run short on visas? Yes, as evidenced by the visa bulletin, which currently has cut-off dates for everyone in EB-2, 3, and 4. EB-5 historically avoided this risk, because EB-5 demand used to be so concentrated in China and visa availability wasn’t so fragmented. But today, with about 40% of EB-5 demand coming from “rest of the world,” and supply numbers within each set-aside category relatively small, “rest of the world” also finds itself on the backlog radar. For example, what if pipeline high unemployment visa demand has reached 2,000 by now, and what if all those applicants reach the visa stage in FY2025? In a year with 2,000 ROW applicants for at most about 1,700 visas available to ROW (2,000 minus 7% each to China and India), the visa bulletin would have to use dates to hold back the 300 excess ROW applicants until the next year’s new supply can accommodate them.

Column D and E:

  • TabIe 2 uses supply numbers rounded to the thousand to facilitate eyeball estimates. For detail of how annual supply gets calculated, with nuances from falling post-COVID EB limits and carryover as a function of usage, see Table 3 below. Considering processing times, I expect that we won’t see pipeline demand for EB-5 set-asides reaching the visa stage in a big way until FY2025. So I’m assuming few set-aside visas issued in FY2024 and thus maximum carryover numbers in FY2025. But I would love to see many set-aside visas issued this year, taking advantage of an unusually high limit and reducing pressure on future supply.

Table 3: EB-5 Visa Supply Detail

EB Annual VisasEB-5 Annual (7.1% EB)Rural Annual (20% EB-5)Rural Carryover UnusedRural Total Annual Visas AvailableRural Visas Used
2022281,50719,9873,9973,9970
2023197,09113,9932,7993,9976,7960
2024161,00011,4312,2862,7995,085<2,799
2025140,0009,9401,9882,2864,274?
2026140,0009,9401,988?1,988?
EB Annual VisasEB-5 Annual (7.1% EB)High Unemployment Annual (10% EB-5)HU Carryover UnusedHigh Unemployment Total Annual VisasHU Visas Used
2022281,50719,9871,9991,9990
2023197,09113,9931,3991,9993,3980
2024161,00011,4311,1431,3992,542<1,399?
2025140,0009,9409941,1432,137?
2026140,0009,940994?994?

Demand for EB-5 Set-aside Categories

Thanks to persistence by AIIA and litigation by Galati Law, we finally have a first installment of data to discuss relative to demand for the new EB-5 set-aside categories. USCIS responded to AIIA’s Freedom of Information Act request, and reported I-526 and I-526E receipts by month from April 2022 to April 2023, itemized by category (including rural and high unemployment) and by petitioner country (including China and India). See AIIA FOIA Series: I-526E Inventory Data for Backlog Assessment for a summary of this extremely consequential information. The article includes an invitation to a webinar on November 15, 2023 at 6:00 PM ET, where I’ll join AIIA, Galati Law, Joseph Barnett, and Charles Oppenheim to discuss the data and implications for reserve visa availability.

FY2024 Set-Aside Visa Availability Update

As an update to previous posts, I note additional pieces of information that have become available about forthcoming EB-5 visa availability in the set-aside/reserve categories.

FY2024 Quota: Department of State has published the Annual Numerical Limits for Fiscal Year 2024, indicating that the Employment-Based visa limit for the year is 161,000 – a bit lower than USCIS had estimated last month, but still well above the base allocation of 140,000. This means another unusually high number of new visas allocated to EB-5 this year, in addition to carryover of unused reserved visas.

Reserve Visa Carryover: At the Department of State/AILA Liaison Committee Meeting October 5, 2023 AILA asked “in FY2024, will DOS first use up reserved visas carried over from FY2023, and only once such numbers are exhausted, use the numbers made available under the FY2024 annual reserved limit?” DOS answered “Yes… the set-aside visas from FY2023 will be added to the same set-aside categories for FY2024 and will be used before the regularly allocated set-aside numbers.” This decision is significant because it maximizes the potential number of reserved visas year-to-year. A new FY24 rural visa can be carried over as FY25 rural visa if unused; the carryover FY24 rural visa must be used this year or else be lost to the category, becoming a FY25 unreserved visa. And so DOS is choosing to allocate carryovers first. (There’s unfortunately no mechanism for unused unreserved visas to carry over to another year, regardless of if they originated from reserve visas carryover, as DOS also confirmed in the AILA Q&A. But I have some hope that consulates and USCIS will work overtime to issue the 14,000+ unreserved EB-5 visas available this year, considering that all available unreserved EB-5 visas were issued in FY2023.)

Reserve Visa Issuance: Department of State also engaged with the IIUSA Leadership Circle in October, and provided additional insights in a report available to IIUSA members. I was particularly interested to hear the confirmation that DOS did not use any reserved EB-5 numbers in FY2023, but does anticipate issuing reserved visas by late FY2024 (considering that USCIS has started to approve I-526E petitions in recent months).

Reserve Visa Availability: Combining the above sources, the following table shows how I now expect EB-5 rural and high unemployment visa availability to look going forward. FY2024 carryover is known, and I expect another full carryover in FY2025. This is based on the assumption that, regardless of how many people have filed I-526E by now, processing constraints mean that USCIS/DOS can’t manage to get over 2,800 rural applicants and/or over 1,400 high unemployment applicants qualified plus interviewed by September 2024 (as would be necessary to exhaust this year’s carryover visas and start touching new visas). The reserve carryover train will continue until the number of category visas possible to issue in a year (thanks to sufficient qualified applicants ready at the visa stage that year) meet or exceed visas available that year. But note that reserved visa availability is not exactly cumulative; if the reserved visas available in a year aren’t issued, only a portion (the new, not the carryover) can remain available for use in the same category in the next year.

EB Annual VisasEB-5 Annual (7.1% EB)Rural Annual (20% EB-5)Rural Carryover from previous yearTotal Annual Visas Available to RuralNumber of Rural Visas Issued
AB=A*.07C=B*.20 (Rural) or B*.10 (HU)DE=C+DF<E if low demand/slow process
2022281,50719,9873,9973,9970
2023197,09113,9932,7993,9976,7960
2024161,00011,4312,2862,7995,085Estimate <2,799 (assuming low demand/slow process)
2025140,000+9,940+1,988+2,286 (assuming not used in FY24)4,274+? (depends on demand and approval timing)
2026140,000+9,940+1,988+? (up to 1,988+)1,988 + any carryover 
EB Annual VisasEB-5 Annual (7.1% EB)High Unemployment Annual (10% EB-5)HU CarryoverTotal Annual Visas Available to HU Number of HU Visas Issued
2022281,50719,9871,9991,9990
2023197,09113,9931,3991,9993,3980
2024161,00011,4311,1431,3992,542Estimate <1,399 (assuming slow process)
2025140,000+9,9409941,143 (assuming not used in FY24)2,137? (depends on demand and approval timing)
2026140,000+9,9409940 if all 2025 visas used, or up to 994994 + any carryover 

When will visa-stage rural and high unemployment applicants first exceed the visa availability outlined above, thus triggering the visa bulletin and country cap limits? This is where we try to estimate:

  • how many investors need to file I-526E to end up with about 4,000 rural visa applicants or 2,000 high unemployment visa applicants (I’d divide visa applicants by about 2, based on guesses about family sizes and approval rates)
  • how long will USCIS take to stock the visa stage by approving over 1,500 rural or over 750 high unemployment I-526E (considering a historical average around 36% of principal applicants in EB-5 visas issued), and
  • how many rural and high unemployment investors can manage to get visas with their families in FY2024, thus reducing demand pressure against the visa supply available in FY2025 and beyond.

Reserve Visa Demand:  So how much demand has accumulated for the new EB-5 reserved visas — and why is this such a hard question to get answered? In Monday’s CIS Ombudsman EB-5 engagement, IPO Chief Alissa Emmel explained why USCIS considers it difficult to share usable data.

Quoted from Minute 50-52 of The CIS Ombudsman’s Webinar Series: Engagement with USCIS on the EB-5 Immigrant Investor Program
Gary Merson, CIS Ombudsman Chief of Staff
Changing topics slightly. We’re hearing from stakeholders who would like to see the agency publish more data on the pending inventory of petitions so that would be investors have a better sense of the visa queues for infrastructure, rural and high employment projects. Can you give us a sense of the challenges in doing so and what options USCIS may be considering to address this issue?

Alissa Emmel, IPO Chief
Sure. I appreciate stakeholder requests for more data, and as an economist and somebody who values data driven decisions, I understand the value that a report on the pending inventory form I-526 and I-526E petitions broken down by visa category could provide to investors. IPO is actively involved in discussions with offices across USCIS to determine how best to present EB-5 data. USCIS strives to make as much data about various aspects of our operations available to the public as possible. We do so to increase transparency and improve public understanding of the immigration system and our role in it. Currently, USCS is working through how best to report Form I-526 and I-526E information, as there are several variables that may impact overall accuracy and therefore the usefulness of such a report. Similar to the rest of the agency, information provided on our paper forms are reported by the applicant, petitioner or requester, or the representative or preparer, so there may be errors on the forms when USCIS receives them. For example, a petitioner may erroneously select the wrong class, preference, or benefit type they are requesting. However unique to the EB-5 program, petitioners may file a form I-526E petition before their associated form I-956F is approved.  As such, at the time of filing the I-526E, the petitioner may not know which visa categories their project may be approved for. Further, some petitioners may be eligible for multiple visa categories, including unreserved visas. These factors are some of the nuances with developing a report prior to the final adjudication of the form I-526 and I-526Es. In addition, it’s important to note that while USCIS always strives to ensure that the data in our electronic systems is accurate, data errors do occur because we transfer data from paper forms to electronic systems manually. I hope it’s helpful to understand some of the considerations that the agency is taking into account while we look at how to best provide information that would be useful for our stakeholders.

As we try to get a handle on EB-5 demand by interpreting I-526E reports from USCIS quarterly reports (available through June 2023 so far) and FOIA requests (coming soon), or by attempting an educated guess from what we see in the market, let’s keep these nuances in mind. We cannot predict exactly how many applicants will eventually reach the end of the visa process and when, even if USCIS would be transparent about the distribution of petitioners starting the process. But I still encourage USCIS to promptly share the TEA investment categories self-reported on I-526E filings. Let the public interpret and discuss that limited data point while adding their own assumptions about human error, denial rates, processing times.

EB-5 Form Processing Update through FY2023 Q3 (June 2023)

USCIS has updated the Immigration and Citizenship Data page with reports for forms filed and processed through June 30, 2023.

Highlights from EB-5 Data in The Q3 All USCIS Application and Petition Form Types report

  • I-956 and I-956F Processing Times: The report states median processing times for Form I-956 (10.8 months) and Form I-956F (11.1 months), which should help people inquiring with USCIS and considering Mandamus actions. (This is useful reference because the Processing Times page does not report yet on I-956 or I-956F. The USCIS-reported times are practically meaningless for prediction, since they’re calculated as the median processing time only of the ≈77 I-956 and the “D” I-956F processed to date, with no adjustment for the waiting time of the hundreds of applications NOT processed. But pending applicants can still use the USCIS-reported times to their advantage when communicating with USCIS.)  
  • Post-RIA EB-5 Demand and Processing: The report shows steady uptick in the number I-526 and I-526E filings, with a total 1,898 post-RIA investor I-526 and I-526E pending as of June 30, 2023. That represents enough EB-5 investors under the new law as of June to claim anywhere from 3,000 to 6,000 visas, depending on approval rates and family size. How we would like to know the country and TEA category distribution of this accumulating visa demand! We’d also like to know whether any of these applicants will be able to claim some of the plentiful FY2024 visas, or if we can expect them to reach the visa stage in future years with smaller visa availability. The number of I-526/I-526E adjudications was still too small to report as of June 30, and processing time listed as “N/A”.
  • Pre-RIA Petition Adjudication: In Q3, USCIS reported processing slightly fewer I-526 and slightly more I-829 than in the previous quarter. Overall, the processing volume in Q3 looks like great improvement if compared to last year, but still bad if compared to any other time period. The improvement so far is very welcome, but must escalate to get IPO out of its deep processing hole. Dividing petitions pending at the end of Q3 by petitions processed during Q3, I get the following equations for time to clear the backlog if USCIS continued processing at the same rate as in Q3. I-526: 10,802/888=12 quarters to clear the I-526 backlog.  I-829: 10,507/474=22 quarters to clear the I-829 backlog. (See my Processing Data page for charts illustrating how adjudications have been spread across filing dates.)
  • Denial Rates: Denial rates in Q3 were thankfully lower than in recent quarters: 28% for I-526 and 6% for I-829.
  • Errata: Comparing the Q3 year-to-date report and pending numbers with previous data reports, I find once more that USCIS is either regularly overestimating and then correcting previously-reported numbers, or regularly losing petitions from the inventory. My charts make the assumption that Q3 numbers are correct where they conflict with previous reports.

EB-5 Form Data from FY2023 Q3 Data Report (April 1, 2023 to June 30, 2023)

FormReceivedApprovedDeniedTotal ProcessedPendingProcessing Time
I-526 (Pre-RIA)63725188810,80248.2
I-52650N/AN/AN/A137N/A
I-526E649N/AN/AN/A1,761N/A
I-8294844443047410,50748.6
I-9564148DH27310.8
I-956F61DD18711.1
I-956G12276N/A
I-956H4932,635N/A
I-956K258N/AN/A

Report of EB-5 Forms Processed and Pending FY2023 to date from FY2023 Q3 Data Report

FormTotal Processed October 1, 2022 to June 30, 2023Total Pending at June 30, 2023
I-526 (Pre-RIA)1,93010,802
I-526 N/A137
I-526E N/A1,761
I-8291,25210,507
I-956 H273
I-956F D187
I-956G –  276
I-956H –  2,635
I-956K –   N/A
I-924 D40
I-924A –  1,734

EB-5 Visa Status Report for 2023/2024

Fiscal Years 2023 and 2024 are good years for EB-5 visa availability, with mixed outlook for visa issuance.  I assess the picture by looking at EB-5 quota limits, EB-5 dates in the October 2023 Visa Bulletin and prior visa bulletins, I-526 filing trends associated with visa bulletin dates, the NVC waiting list, monthly visa issuance, and I-526 and I-526E processing trends. The picture that emerges from all this data shows winners and losers created primarily by the processing capacity of USCIS and Department of State. I begin with comments, followed by charts and tables. (9/29 UPDATE: This post has been revised to add monthly data for August 2023 and a revised FY2024 EB visa limit estimate.)

Winners in 2023/2024 EB-5 visa issuance

Win for unreserved EB-5 visa applicants generally

Department of State reports that “most” 2023 employment-based visas available were actually used in 2023 – making this the first year since 2019 without major EB visa loss. And 2024 could be an even better year for unreserved visa issuance, contingent on USCIS and DOS processing capacity. Unreserved EB-5 gets a windfall in 2024 of the 6,400 reserved EB-5 visas not used in 2022, on top of its regular 68% allocation of an unusually high EB-5 limit, for a total of over 14,000 unreserved visas available in FY2024. (See Table 1 below.) If only USCIS and consulates can manage to issue that many visas! Any unreserved FY2024 visas not used in FY2024 will be permanently lost to EB-5.

Win for unreserved visa applicants from India

India continues to be subject to country cap limits, but Mumbai has been issuing EB-5 visas aggressively and efficiently, and the adjustment of status process is working. As result, Indians have received as many as or more than the number of EB-5 visas technically available to Indians in 2022 and 2023 (see charts and tables below).

And the Visa Bulletin is being very generous to India. The October 2023 Visa Bulletin has already moved the India Final Action Date to December 15, 2018, from its pre-retrogression date of June 2018 – thus already releasing more Indian applicants for final action in 2024 than visas available to India in 2024, by my calculation. (My estimate considers the 773 I-526 filed by Indian investors from June 2018 to December 2018, and the about 1,000 unreserved EB-5 visas available in FY2024 under the country cap for investors plus family.) And even more generously, the October 2023 Visa Bulletin gives India EB-5 a Filing Date in April 2022. This allows all Indians in the queue for unreserved EB-5 visas to file I-485 and apply for advance parole and travel benefits — even though EB-5 green cards may not be available for post-2019 Indian priority dates until the end of the decade, absent a large number of dropouts from the current queue. (See my backlog data file for detail, or AIIA’s calculator tool.)

Wins for some unreserved visa applicants from China

Poor performance by many consulates worldwide has meant that rest-of-world EB-5 visa issuance has remained fairly low — below rest-of-world EB-5 demand. This failure benefits Chinese applicants by increasing the number of “otherwise unused” EB-5 visas left available for allocation to the oldest priority dates – i.e. to China-born applicants. EB-5 visa issuance to China in 2023 exceeded what I had expected looking at the waiting list from other countries. (See Table 2 below.) If only the Guangzhou consulate can keep up, the large number of unreserved EB-5 visas available in 2024 should significantly benefit the oldest Chinese priority dates. But it depends on the Guangzhou consulate managing unusually high-volume EB-5 interview scheduling this year.

Another mixed blessing comes from discriminatory policies resulting in high denial rates for Chinese I-526 and visa applications. As hundreds of Chinese keep falling out of the EB-5 backlog due to denials/revocations/withdrawals, those who do remain in the process keep advancing hundreds of spaces closer to getting a visa. The October 2023 Visa Bulletin advances the China EB-5 Date for Filing a whole year — from January 2016 (where the date had lingered since early 2020) to January 2017. This unprecedented large leap potentially allows at least 20,000 more Chinese EB-5 visa applications on the table – or so one would think, knowing that Chinese filed 10,450 I-526 petitions between January 2016 and December 2016. But Department of State must be counting on a large percentage of those 10,450 Chinese EB-5 investors who started in 2016 having subsequently dropped out, or lost their spouses and children, such that their actual visa applications won’t in practice overwhelm the near-term visas available to China. (Depending on rest-of-world visa issuance and Guangzhou capacity, China could get at most up to 10,000 EB-5 visas in 2024.)

Win for a fraction of reserved EB-5 visa applicants

USCIS has recently approved some I-526E, both for rural and high-unemployment projects. Not 100s or 1000s of approvals from what I’ve heard, but at least multiples of 10. USCIS is under pressure to show they are implementing the new law, so they have to adjudicate at least some I-526E instead of just leaving them to wait fairly behind the older I-526 backlog. I’m sure that USCIS can’t possibly manage the 3,000 or so I-526E approvals that would be needed very soon to use the 8,000+ reserve visas available in 2024 (if indeed that many I-526E have even been filed yet). But it’s going to be great for the portion of I-526E petitions that do get approved and advanced in 2024 – they’ll be swimming in visa availability. I-526E that remain pending in 2024 will face narrower visa availability when they reach the visa stage in future years.

Losers in 2023/2024 EB-5 visa issuance

Losses for EB-5 applicants from Vietnam, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Other Countries

Due to USCIS and DOS processing issues, actual EB-5 visa issuance has been lower than demand for many countries with no country cap limit. The National Visa Center had over 5,000 EB-5 applicants registered in November 2022 from countries other than China and India (the only countries with a country cap limit for EB-5). And yet by the end of August 2023, DOS had issued fewer than 3,000 EB-5 visas to those rest-of-world applicants. What’s your EB-5 problem, consulates? You had over 5,000+ EB-5 visas available in 2023 that could’ve gone to those 5,000+ applicants – why not allocate them? (And the problem does seem to be EB-5-specific, since consulates performed pretty consistently overall in 2023 across IV categories.)

Applicants from Hong Kong received fewer than 100 EB-5 visas in 2023 even though over 600 Hong Kong EB-5 applicants were registered and waiting at NVC. What’s the excuse? Why did Ho Chi Minh City issue only 527 EB-5 visas in the first 11 months of 2023, although the year started with over 1,500 Vietnamese registered at NVC (and no country cap limit for Vietnam this year per the Visa Bulletin)? Why do the monthly visa issuance statistics show that many consulates only got going with EB-5 interviews near the end of the year, instead of working consistently throughout the year as they’re supposed to do (or instead of working aggressively at the beginning of the year, as Mumbai did)? In particular, consulates in Seoul, Montreal, Rio de Janeiro, and Bogota did little EB-5 work the start of 2023. Let’s not repeat this pattern in 2024.

There’s a non-trivial risk that unreserved EB-5 could have Visa Bulletin cut-off dates for every single country (as is the case for EB-1 to EB-4) in 2025 or 2026. This could happen if DOS continues to let rest-of-world visa demand pile up from year to year while USCIS keeps adding to the NVC waiting list by approving I-526 from a variety of countries. The investor association AIIA has consular processing problems on its agenda, and we should support efforts to investigate and address this important problem area.

Losses for EB-5 investors who can’t get I-526 or I-526E approval shortly

The Investor Program Office has significantly increased I-526 processing volume in recent months (see my regularly-updated Processing Data page), so I have some hope for visa issuance in 2024. But this great trend must continue and escalate, because 2024 visa availability is only good for qualified visa applicants. People with I-526 or I-526E pending can’t move. The charts on my processing data page reflect the chaotic nature of I-526 processing activity, with some recent cases adjudicated while other older cases get left pending for unknown reasons. The longer I-526 and I-526E remain pending, the more they risk limited visa availability and visa-stage crowds once they finally do reach the visa stage. We depend on you, IPO, to keep increasing processing volume so that EB-5 visas can get issued before they’re lost!

Table 1. EB-5 Visa Availability

EB-5 Visas Available FY2023FY2024
ABase EB-5 Allocation (=7.1% of annual EB)13,99311,715*
Unreserved EB-5 Visas AvailableFY2023FY2024
BBase Allocation for Unreserved (=68% of A)9,5167,966
CCarryover Unused Reserve (from 2 years previous)06,396
DTotal Unreserved Visas Available (=B+C)9,51614,362
ETotal available under Country Cap (=D*7%)6661,005
FAverage visas available per month (=B/12)7931,197
GAverage visas per country per month (=E/12)5684
Reserved EB-5 Visas AvailableFY2023FY2024
HBase Allocation for Reserved (=32% of A)4,4783,749
ICarryover Unused Reserve (from previous year)6,3964,478
JTotal Reserved Visas Available (=H+I)10,8748,227
Visas IssuedFY2023FY2024
KUnreserved Visas Issued9,516 (estimate)TBD
LReserved Visas Issued0 (estimate)TBD
Visas LostFY2023FY2024
MUnreserved Visas Lost (rolled up to EB-1/EB-2)0 (estimate)TBD
NReserved Visas Lost (carried over to unreserve)6,396 (estimate)TBD
*Note: Table revised on 9/22 to reflect the USCIS estimate that the EB limit in FY2024 is 165,000 — higher than the typical 140,000.

Table 2. FY2023EB-5 Unreserved Visa Issuance through Consular Processing

Country of chargeabilityTotal EB-5 Applicants Registered at NVC as of November 2022Actual EB-5 Visa Issuance Through Consular Processing October 2022 to August 2023*
China – mainland born38,8745,627
India1,362676
Vietnam1,534527
Korea, South560407
Hong Kong S.A.R.68885
All Others2,4801,034
Total45,4988,356
*Note: In FY2023, DOS should theoretically have issued 666 visas to India (its limit under the 7% country cap), visas to everyone on the NVC waiting list for Vietnam, South Korea, Hong Kong, and other countries (since they have no country limit), and then about 3,500 visas to China (because that’s the difference between rest-of-world demand and the 9,500 visas available in 2023). But in fact, it appears that India and China received more and Rest-of-World countries received fewer visas in 2023 than I would have expected. Table 2 covers visas issued through consular processing only (and only through August 2023), not adjustment of status.

Posts like this take so much time to research and write, and yet can still only answer a fraction of the questions that you may have. I am available to provide additional data and more detailed explanation, and to address individual questions. Just email me at suzanne@lucidtext.com to schedule a paid consultation. I have also made data available on the EB5 Timing and Processing Data pages. For visa wait time predictions, note that AIIA has combined my data library with their FOIA data and created an automated Pre-RIA Visa Wait Time Calculator. The AIIA tool is nice because it’s built around a core of known fact — how many EB-5 investors per country started the EB-5 process by filing I-526 — and then allows the user add assumptions about unknown visa-demand variables such as future family size and denial rates. Note also that IIUSA has a nice article on the topic of FY2023 consular processing, including comparison with previous years: IIUSA Data Analysis: EB-5 Visa Issuance Monthly Data Updates for FY2023 (September 2022 – July 2023).

FY2023 Q3 Processing Data, I-956 data, I-526E litigation

Yesterday, USCIS finally published performance data for January to March 2023, including — for the first time — receipt and processing data for the new EB-5 forms created a year and a half ago. I’ve copied a summary chart at the base of the post.

Insights from the FY2023 Q2 data report

  • USCIS now realizes that pre-Integrity Act I-526 and post-Integrity Act I-526 and I-526E are each fundamentally different forms that need to be reported separately. Thank you USCIS! I’m also happy to see USCIS finally starting to count all the new I-956 forms.
  • Despite my pleas, USCIS data reporting still does not include any information about I-526/I-526E filings by TEA category and country of origin — data without which it’s impossible for the public to monitor and preempt potential visa backlogs in the new EB-5 visa categories. (But good news: champion litigator Matt Galati came out this week with sword swinging in the cause of transparency, and filed a lawsuit on behalf of the investor organization AIIA to sue USCIS to provide the data. I am happy to see the EB-5 community working together and taking action to avoid repetition of the backlog problems facilitated by USCIS opacity and obstruction in the past.)
  • The USCIS report shows that most EB-5 adjudications in FY2023 have been of forms filed prior to the Integrity Act. This is only fair to the pre-Integrity Act backlog, and also unfortunate for Integrity Act implementation. EB-5 processing volume in Q2 was 66% better overall than the previous quarter (yay!), but still 20% worse than even at the height of the Pandemic (sigh), and still almost four times lower than what IPO processed with fewer employees prior to 2019. It’s great to see a near-term volume trend in the right direction, but the lift is still so small in context of what IPO could and should be doing. Failure rates also continue to be disturbingly high, with a shocking 55% of I-526 completions and 19% of I-829 completions being denials or withdrawals. Matt Galati and AIIA are also pursuing litigation to get at the reasons behind the increasing number of denials.
  • USCIS has received approximately 1,217 I-526E and I-526 investor petitions since the new EB-5 law passed in March 2022, and reports processing exactly “N/A” of these forms to date, with N/A defined as “not available.” I interpret N/A as signifying zero. This is unsurprising, considering that investor I-526E cannot be processed until the associated I-956F and I-956 have been processed for project and regional center approval, and 956 adjudications are proceeding slowly. Also, considering the 11,206 pending I-526 with earlier filing dates before the law change. But what if USCIS does pick up steam and processes all those 1,217 pending post-Integrity Act I-526? If a thousand petitioners arrive at the visa stage, each bringing a spouse and child, that would translate into demand for 3,000+ EB-5 visas — about the number of EB-5 reserve visas available in a typical year. So we are correct to start thinking already about potential backlogs and try to get the data needed to track/avoid them. (Update: I have now heard of three I-526E approvals, including this one.)
  • USCIS reports receiving just over 132 I-956F Applications for Approval of Investment in a New Commercial Enterprise since the new regional center program’s inception in May 2022. USCIS had processed exactly “D” of these forms as of March 2022, with D representing a number that USCIS considers too small to report. (See the base of this post for a list of the I-956F approvals that I’ve seen reported online.) I-956F approvals are critical, as the signal that I-526E processing could move forward.
  • It appears that about 300 regional centers have committed to activity under the new Integrity Act regional center program by filing a I-956 application for program compliance and I-956G annual report. Meanwhile the USCIS Regional Center List continues to show 640 regional centers, with no hint as to which are simply legacy shepherds of pre-Integrity Act investment and which have taken the necessary steps to comply and raise funds under the new program. So confusing! How can we tell which regional centers out in the market are in compliance?
  • Since October 2022, USCIS reports approving 28 I-956 regional center applications. Some of these are pre-Integrity Act regional centers reaffirming designation, while others are new. The USCIS Regional Center List appears to mark RCs that are new post-Integrity Act with a new style of ID number beginning with the letters RC. From examining post-Integrity Act RCs, I learn that the “regional” in “regional center” has a loose definition, with 3+ states being the standard “limited geographic area” for the purpose of pooling EB-5 capital.
  • The USCIS report includes a “Processing Time” column that gives a figure representing the median age of forms processed during that period. It’s important to realize that this number is not general or predictive. For example, Form I-956 shows a “processing time” of 7.3 months. This only means that among the 18 I-956 approved last quarter, the median processing wait was 7.3 months — saying nothing about the wait for unprocessed forms. For prediction, it’s more relevant to look at the number of I-956 pending — 280 — and how long it would take to process that many if IPO continues at the rate of 18 approvals per quarter or 6 per month. 280/6=47 months — yikes! Keep stepping up your game, USCIS!
  • Once again, I notice that reported numbers rarely quite add up. Last quarter’s period-end pending plus this quarter’s receipts minus this quarter’s processed rarely equals this quarter’s period-end pending. Q1 receipts reported a few months ago do not match the Q1 receipts implied in this quarter’s report of Q2 and fiscal year total receipts. So take each report with a bit of salt. USCIS needs better technology. And if reports can’t be more clean, as least they might be more prompt. It’s July, and we’re only now finding out a bit of what’s been happening with EB-5 forms since January.
FY2023 Q2 Data
FormDescriptionReceivedApprovedDeniedTotal ProcessedPendingProcessing Time (median months)
I-526 (legacy)Immigrant Petition by Alien Investor               –           406        498            90411,60250.1
I-526Immigrant Petition by Standalone Investor            40                 –             –                 –90
I-526EImmigrant Petition by Regional Center Investor          495                 –             –                 –1,127 
 I-526 Total          535           406        498            90412,819 
I-829Petition by Investor to Remove Conditions          352           362          85            44710,54248.8
I-956Application for Regional Center Designation          176              18  D   D 2807.3
I-956FApplication for Approval of Investment in a Commercial Enterprise            50  D              –  D 132 N/A
I-956GRegional Center Annual Statement          287                 –             –                 –282 N/A
I-956HBona Fides of Person Involved in Regional Center Program       1,007                 –             –                 –2,147 N/A
I-956KRegistration for Direct and Third-Party Promoters            38                 –             –                 – N/A N/A
I-924Application For Regional Center Designation               –                 –  D   D 84 N/A
I-924AAnnual Certification of Regional Center               –                 –             –                 –1,734 N/A

Log of I-956F Approvals (please email suzanne@lucidtext.com with any additions to this table)

Regional CenterProjectFiling DateApproval DateTEA
Pine State Regional CenterBig River Steel Phase II6/30/20223/24/2023rural
Manhattan Regional CenterManhattan 11th Ave Marriott Tribute Portfolio Hotel Project7/19/20226/15/2023high unemployment
Can AmJefferson Energy Project II7/6/20226/21/2023 
CMBGroup 78 7/6/2023high unemployment
Can AmRhoads III Project7/6/20228/10/2023high unemployment
CMBGroup 82 8/11/2023 

An Open Letter to Kevin Muck at IPO about I-526 data and avoiding EB-5 backlogs

*******************************

Dear Kevin Muck,

You introduced yourself in the October 2022 EB-5 stakeholder meeting as I-526 Division Chief at IPO, with ten years of experience as an IPO economist preceded by eight years of service at the Bureau of Economic Analysis.

With your background and status, you should be capable and informed about the EB-5 process. But you said something ignorant and dangerous in today’s EB-5 stakeholder engagement.

A question was asked about reporting I-526/I-526E receipt data by TEA category/country, for the purpose of monitoring and avoiding backlogs in the new TEA categories. You responded that stakeholders should consult the Visa Bulletin, and see that the current Visa Bulletin reports TEA categories as “current.”

Think about it, Kevin. Do EB-5 backlogs not exist until they appear at the visa stage/in the visa bulletin? Do you believe that someone filing I-526E today gets visa availability based on the dates in today’s Visa Bulletin?

If you think that, try to look in the face of an Indian who filed I-526 in December 2020, and say “You didn’t need to know about the 2,300+ other Indian I-526 we already had on file at USCIS in December 2020, but didn’t disclose except through FOIA years later.” Try to tell him: “The December 2020 visa bulletin when you filed I-526 said that India EB-5 was current so obviously you were good to go — no backlog for you to worry about when you invested! The visas available to India back when you filed I-526 must still be available to you now, right? Oh… wait… you can’t actually apply for a visa now because India EB-5 now shows as backlogged to mid 2018 in today’s visa bulletin. But how could anyone have guessed? Those visa bulletin dates appear out of nowhere! Surely nothing to do with the number of Indians who filed I-526 in 2018/2019, or our rate of adjudication! Surely IPO was right to ignore Suzanne when she wrote over and over to the IPO Customer Service Mailbox, begging for backlog-relevant I-526 data to enable backlog/wait time prediction! Why would anyone need to ask how many people are entering and lingering in the back of the queue at USCIS, when the Visa Bulletin reports conditions just fine at the terminus of the queue at Department of State?”

Think about it: in a situation where unlimited tickets can be sold for limited seats, why might prospective ticket buyers possibly want to inquire about how many tickets have already been sold?

In a situation where I-526 filing numbers turn into future priority dates for visa issuance, why might anyone possibly want to ask about filing numbers? Do you say — sorry, just wait ’til you all reach the visa application stage and then find out from the visa bulletin?

Kevin Muck, think about today’s prospective investor from China who is considering EB-5 investment with a rural project. With the 20% rural allocation and 7% country cap, that investor can count certainly on competing for one of about 140 visas per year (about 10,000*20%*7%) – anything above that depends on the unknowns of current/future rest-of-world demand and carryover timing. With such limited availability, why might that prospective investor want to know how many Chinese have already filed I-526 for rural projects, whether 80 or 800? Why could that prospect want timely data to show whether/when I-526 volume overall is sufficient to max out the category and activate country caps once the demand reaches the visa stage? Why might she want the receipt data necessary to estimate whether the rural queue already formed at the I-526 stage is of a size to take two years or 10 years to make it past the visa window? And it’s not only investors who want to estimate their investment and immigration horizon at the time of investment — issuers and projects and regional centers require this for their planning as well. And the government also has an interest.

Think about it: what’s the word for soliciting investment with an incentive that might not actually be available? When the U.S. government offers an investor visa incentive, at the same time making it impossible for the investor or issuers to estimate visa availability at the time of investment, I’d call that fraud by the government. It rests on IPO to keep the U.S. government out of such embarrassment by reporting on the I-526 filings that drive EB-5 visa demand and availability.

I have requested this so many times from USCIS, but I know your name and your face now, Kevin Muck, and the size of your salary, and I appeal to you personally. Now that you’ve applied your economist brain to the situation and realize the importance of this data for program integrity, please help make it happen! Here is the report that we need to have USCIS start publishing, at minimum quarterly and at minimum with data no less than three months old. (Even better if we can get monthly reports with data only one month old, but truly anything will be an improvement over current blank silence. USCIS already provides monthly reporting internally to the visa bulletin working group, so adding public reporting should not be a great reach.)

Number of I-526 receipts by country and category for the period ______    
 Rural TEAHigh Unemployment TEAInfrastructure TEAUnreserved
All countries    
China    
India    
Vietnam    
Mexico    

*Note: It seems that we need only these countries in the report, since the Federal Register notice RIN 1400–ZA27 clarified that the per-country limit is only triggered when demand exceeds 7% of all FB and EB visas. Which historically means that only China, India, Vietnam, Mexico, Philippines and Dominican Republic are in the country cap danger zone overall, and the last two can safely be disregarded for this report since they’ve never been remotely significant in EB-5.

That’s all for now Kevin. Thank you for putting yourself out to be faced with challenges like these. I depend on you to talk USCIS out of its practice of concealing I-526/I-526E filing information.

Sincerely,

Suzanne

(For more background and explanation, see also AIIA’s well-researched article How does the Visa Bulletin Work? And for such EB-5 demand data as I have managed to collect by hook or by crook, see my regularly updated Processing Data page and the Excel file I keep linked to the top of my EB-5 Timing Page.)

FY2022 Annual Report of the Visa Office for EB-5 visas issued by country

The Department of State has finished publishing its Report of the Visa Office 2022. The report covers EB-5 visas issued from October 2021 to September 2022, with breakdown by country of origin, path (consular processing or status adjustment), and category (direct, regional center, TEA, reserved, unreserved). I’ve been waiting anxiously for the report, wondering about visa wastage, Integrity Act implementation, and impacts on the visa backlog and EB-5 visa wait times for China, India, and Vietnam.

This post comments on highlights, followed by data tables summarized from the reports.

FY2022 EB-5 Visa Issuance and Wastage

USCIS actually issued 10,885 of the unusually-high 19,987 EB-5 visas available in 2022.   Of the 9,102 EB-5 visas that didn’t get issued in FY2022, 6,396 couldn’t have been issued because segregated in newly-created set-aside categories. (The unused set-asides should carry over in future years, though the FY23 visa limits report doesn’t show the carryover.) The remaining 2,706 unused EB-5 visas in FY2022 were permanently lost to EB-5. (FY2022 is still much better than FY2021, when EB-5 lost 15,673 total visas, and FY2020, when EB-5 lost 7,498 visas.)

Visa wastage particularly affected countries with mostly regional center applicants using consular processing. For example, South Koreans got 695 EB-5 visas in 2019 (the most recent “normal” year) but only 396  visas in 2022 (86% by consular processing), despite the fact that 909 South Korean EB-5 applicants were ready and registered at the National Visa Center at the start of 2022. Hong Kong likewise suffered, with only 142 EB-5 visas issued in FY2022 despite 866 Hong Kong applicants ready at NVC at the start of the year. Meanwhile Indians, many adjusting status in the U.S., managed to get a record 1,381 visas in 2022 – even more than technically available to them under the year’s unreserved visa limit.

Reasons for FY2022 EB-5 Visa Wastage

EB-5 visa issuance in FY2022 was as low as it was largely due to the unfortunately protracted regional center program expiration, and the policy that prevented visas from being issued to regional center applicants from October 2021 to May 2022. (I wish that policy could be litigated on behalf of the over 18,000 EB-5 visas lost during the expiration.) Monthly visas statistics show that all regional center visas issued in FY2022 were packed into just four months: June to September 2022.  

The government had the entire year to issue direct EB-5 visas, but only issued 621, likely constrained by low demand (i.e. few direct I-526 filed and even fewer making it through I-526 processing to the visa stage). By comparison, 414 direct EB-5 visas were issued in the last normal year of FY2019.

Consular processing numbers were also depressed overall compared with FY2019, reflecting on-going struggles with post-COVID backlogs. For color on why the steps in consular processing remain so slow and problematic, see questions and answers in the Department of State/AILA Liaison Committee Meeting February 9, 2023, the NVC Immigrant Visa Backlog report (look at trends in the number of interview appointments, and compare appointment volume with backlog size), and the October 2022 Update on Worldwide Visa Operations. Those in or approaching consular processing should be aware of the NVC Timeframes page, with information on process status and times. The bright side is that consular problems affect not only EB-5 but also family-based visa issuance, and EB-5 benefits in 2023 from a share in FB visas that went un-issued in 2022 (as reflected in 2023’s unusually high EB visa limit).

High Volume of EB-5 Status Adjustments in FY2022

EB-5 visa issuance in FY2022 was as high as it was thanks to an unprecedented high number of status adjustments (37% of the total, as compared with 17% in 2019). For example comparing 2022 with 2019 visa issuance, China got fewer visas last year through consular processing but five times as many visas through status adjustment. 

The unusually high AOS numbers reflect the fact that USCIS got political pressure and made herculean efforts at the end of FY2022 to step up work on employment-based status adjustments, even as consular processing continued to struggle post-COVID.  

Direct EB-5 (and the visa bulletin even briefly becoming Current for China direct EB-5) did not contribute much boost. China ended the year with only 199 direct EB-5 visas issued – not much higher than usual, and not explaining the unexpected thousands of Chinese who adjusted status in 2022.

RIA Implementation, Reserved Visas, and Country Caps

Report of the Visa Office 2022 does segregate EB-5 visas into “5th Unreserved” and “5th Set-Aside” categories, reflecting changes to visa availability made by the EB-5 Reform and Integrity Act enacted March 15, 2022. Of course, no visas were issued in 2022 in the “5th Set-Aside” categories, since no applicants who filed I-526 after March 15, 2022 could have reached the visa stage in time. And according to Department of State interpretation, all EB-5 applicants with pre-March 2022 priority dates can only now qualify for a visa in the new 68% unreserved category, regardless of whether they invested in a TEA that matches new definitions. (I think this interpretation can and ought to be challenged, at at least one lawsuit by DRVC is challenging it, but it’s the fact for now.)

In theory, country caps further restrict availability within each category. Thus pending applicants from any one country can only expect up to 7% of the 68% unreserved EB-5 visas (with “otherwise unused” unreserved numbers going to the oldest priority dates i.e. Chinese).

In 2022, this theory held true for Vietnam but not for India. While both countries have excess demand for unreserved visas, and large NVC backlogs, the government in fact issued 815 EB-5 visas to Vietnam (about 7% of unreserved EB-5 visas) and 1,381 EB-5 visas to India (about 7% of total EB-5 visas). Hmmm…

Was this different treatment of Indians and Vietnamese an oversight, with the government remembering the unreserved limit in the new law for Vietnam while forgetting it for India? 2022 was naturally confusing for the Visa Office, which had to deal with a mid-year law change and leadership change. Or did many Indians get lucky just because they happened to be in the US, unlike most Chinese and Vietnamese EB-5 applicants with earlier priority dates? I wonder if maybe Indians got assigned “otherwise unused” numbers at the end of the year that should’ve gone by right to earlier Chinese priority dates, but practically couldn’t because the consulate in China lacked capacity to hold more interviews in time while the California Service Center had capacity to complete more I-485 and help avoid wastage. (I also wonder if a difference between consular and USCIS capacity to issue visas at the end of the year could explain the unusually high number of Chinese regional center applicants who were able to adjust status in FY2022 — more applicants than one would expect from priority date order.)

Country Diversity

FY2022 was similar to previous years in terms of countries claiming the most EB-5 visas. As in 2019, the top users in 2022 were (in descending order): China, India, Vietnam, South Korea, Brazil, and Taiwan. Meanwhile, Mexico, Canada, Russia, and Iran moved a few notches up the list in 2022, while Venezuela, South Africa, Great Britain, and Japan moved a few notches down. I was surprised mainly by the number of Canadians on this year’s list (why, Canada?) and Iranians (considering the often arduous source of funds path).

Visa Demand Context

For a reminder of the size of the visa queue before FY2022 visa issuance,  see the presentation by Charles Oppenheim for IIUSA in November 2021. At that time, Oppenheim estimated the EB-5 backlog (including applicants already registered at NVC and potential future applicants associated with I-526 pending at USCIS) at 57,253 visa applicants for China, 7,418 for India, 3,954 for Vietnam, and 18,054 for other countries  (see Slide 10).

Visas issued in 2022 reduced those queues by 6,125 visas to China, 1,381 visas to India, and 815 visas to Vietnam. (I assume that I-526 filings in 2022 didn’t grow the queues very much, unless it turns out that most of the 829 receipts last year came from Indians).  

The future wait times associated with that scary queue depend on (1) how many petitioners/applicants in the queue will ultimately give up/lose eligibility before they can clam a visa (likely a large number given the untenable wait times looming for Chinese and Indians near the end of the queue), and (2) how many EB-5 visas will be issued per year from now on, with the base case being 9,940 EB-5 visas * 68% unreserved * 7% country cap = up to 473 to applicants of each country. The actual number of visas available per-country in a given year can be significantly higher than the 473 base case based on carryover of family-based visas (as happened in FY2022 and happening again in FY2023 due to COVID-19), carryover of reserved visas (as should happen in 2024 and 2025 assuming law compliance and continued slow I-526 processing), and unreserved visas leftover after country caps (which should increasingly benefit China in coming years).  But even with the most optimistic assumptions on future visa availability, Chinese who filed I-526 from October 2016-March 2022 and Indians who filed I-526 from November 2019-March 2022 could face five or more years of waiting just for conditional permanent residence. Or would face that wait, except that it exceeds what many applicants (not to mention their RCs, projects, and investments) can practically bear, predictably leading to many queue-shortening drop-outs/failures. Meanwhile, new investors in reserved categories have to sweat over limited availability (with just 20%, 10% or 2% of visas available in each new lane, further restricted under the 7% country cap) and guessing the time for I-526 filings to invisibly build and max out that limited availability. I’ll write more about unreserved and reserved visa availability and wait time issues in separate articles.

The bottom line is that EB-5 suffers from a supply problem. EB-5 needs more visa numbers in order to accomplish what regional centers, investors, and public policy all require: a stable and predictable immigration opportunity that can accommodate new investors plus prevent a despairing rush for the exits for past investors/investment.

Tables based on the Annual Report of the Visa Office

December/January Updates (Regional Center status, visa availability, I-526 and I-829 Processing in Q4, Fee Rule, Form I-526 and I-956 revisions and comments)

A quick roundup of significant EB-5 developments since last report – rather delayed, while I held out for good news. I did not expect to start my 14th year in EB-5 grappling with basic questions like “How and why do regional centers exist?” and “Is EB-5 an immigration opportunity?” I hope that 2023 will bring policy clarifications and processing improvements to help resolve such questions, which should not be open.

Regional Center Status

On December 23, USCIS slipped a new sentence onto the USCIS website: “Dec. 29, 2022, is no longer the deadline to file Form I-956, Application for Regional Center Designation, amendments, as required by the Behring Settlement, and Form I-956G, Regional Center Annual Statement. USCIS is extending this deadline until we publish guidance that clarifies the requirements of these forms.”

I saw this update on Christmas Eve and thought about leaving the nieces and nephews to report on it, but why? EB-5 stakeholders needed this notice months ago. By three business days before the deadline, everyone had already had to make their guesses and gambles and done what they were going to do with I-956 and I-956G (if they even realized that a December 29 deadline existed, since USCIS did not offer I-956 guidance to the general public, but only in litigation settlement and a private meeting with a few litigation plaintiffs). USCIS and industry are not sure how to handle the regional center application, amendment, and reporting forms because we lack clarity or agreement on basic questions about regional center identity and responsibilities. The effect of the Integrity Act on previously-approved regional centers and their investors remains unclear. Nine months after the Integrity Act passed, the USCIS Policy Manual section on regional center designation and termination remains vacant.  Meanwhile, billions of dollars are flowing in real time under sponsorship of entities and from investors who aren’t sure what eligibility requirements do or will apply to them. On the bright side, I’m glad that USCIS acknowledged a need to “clarify the requirements,” and did not stick to an unreasonable deadline. And stakeholders now have more time to provide input.

Form I-956, I-956F, I-956G, and I-956K

The Federal Register has re-opened opportunity to comment on the new regional center forms I-956, I-956F, I-956G, and I-956K. Feedback will be accepted until January 26, 2023. (Click on the “View More Documents” button to see what you’re commenting on.) This is a great chance to submit your view on the application/implementation of regional center requirements, because a responsible person at DHS is compelled to actually read and respond to each comment made through the regulatory process. It’s not like stakeholder meeting comments, which can disappear into the void. I was interested to read USCIS’s digest and responses to the previous round of comments. Many stakeholder questions about ambiguities were met with the response “USCIS may consider rulemaking to address these issues.”

I-526 and I-829 Receipt and Processing Data

USCIS published form receipt and processing data for FY2022 Q4 (July to September 2022), and I also received data unofficially for EB-5 adjudications in October to December 2022. See my Processing Data page with updated charts and detail for I-526, I-829, and I-485 processing through the end of the year.

Short report: fantastic performance for I-485 at the California Service Center in Q4 (thanks to USCIS leadership for prioritizing EB visa issuance and to Congress for applying political pressure that proved effective!), and on-going terrible performance by the Investor Program Office. IPO is still on track to deliver over-six-year processing times for I-526 and I-829, still chaotic in the date range of petitions being processed, and still denying a large percentage of I-526. In July to September 2022, over half of I-526 adjudications were denials. Fiscal Year 2022 ended with a total of 590 I-526 approvals and 825 denials/withdrawals; in other words, $295+ million in EB-5 investment yielded a chance to pursue a visa while $423.5+ million was invested without resulting in any chance to immigrate. These dreadful numbers can trace back to factors including economic pressures on EB-5 projects, heightened risk from long processing delays, the legacy of “extreme vetting” philosophy, and rogue IPO staff alone in their home offices and apparently free to make up and apply idiosyncratic standards of proof for source of funds. I expect the I-526 success rate to improve if and when IPO standardizes and publicly articulates its policy and adjudication guidelines, shortens processing times, and increases staff supervision and quality control.

I-956 and I-956F filings commenced in Q4, but the USCIS data report for Q4 does not report them. The USCIS Office of Performance and Quality may not even realize that the I-956 forms exist, and still has line items for I-924. OPQ did add I-526E to its Q4 data reporting, lumped in one line item together with I-526. Just 188 I-526/I-526E were filed in July to September 2022.

USCIS Fee Rule

The Federal Register has published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for the future USCIS fee schedule, with a public comment period open until March 6, 2023. USCIS invites the public to a listening session for the Proposed Rule on January 11 at 2 pm ET.

The fee rule process is critical, because it determines over 90 percent of USCIS funding and whether or not USCIS has “the resources it needs to provide adequate service.” The fee rule process is a major reason why USCIS never has ended up with needed resources or adequate service. If you want a good cry and to lose some hair, read the 132,341 words that explain the budgeting methodology and assumptions. I am working on an in-depth article discussing the rule’s EB-5-related content. The obvious headline is the huge proposed increase to EB-5 form filing fees. But I’m more concerned by the assumptions and plans disclosed in discussion of how USCIS arrived at the proposed fees, and the question of how to respond strategically so that the Investor Program Office ends up with resources.

UPDATE: The IIUSA blog has published my detailed analysis of the formula and inputs behind the fee rule, with thoughts on how to respond.

Visa Availability

Congress did not, after all, pass the EAGLE Act or repeal country caps as part of FY2023 appropriations, which means that (for now) EB-5 visa availability remains constrained/protected by caps that limit any one country to 7% of visas in oversubscribed categories. In the near term, that on-going status quo is good news for anyone in EB-5 who isn’t an in-process EB-5 applicant born in China, India, or Vietnam.

The new EB-5 set-aside categories remain enticingly “Current” in the Visa Bulletin, which means nothing for planning because the Visa Bulletin cannot see and does not flag crowds, if any, when they start at the I-526 stage. The Visa Bulletin only monitors and controls the later visa stage, not the queue on its way to the visa stage. USCIS knows how many people are getting in line by filing I-526/I-526E, but USCIS has persistently refused to publicly report on I-526 filings/inventory by category or country. This leaves stakeholders blind to visa backlogs until the backlogs have already built up and too late to avoid.

If only USCIS would report timely and category/country-specific I-526 filing data, then we could project and compare in-process visa demand with available visa supply to calculate availability/timing for each EB-5 category.  USCIS should want to empower prospective EB-5 users to judge upfront whether and when EB-5 could offer an opportunity to immigrate. The U.S. government engages in fraud when offers an investor visa incentive while making it impossible to assess, at the time of investment, the availability of that incentive. (So far, I’ve only succeeded in getting USCIS to answer in November 2022 a Freedom of Information Act request that I submitted in February 2020 for I-526 inventory by country, having previously fruitlessly tried to get country-specific I-526 data via IPO customer service requests. The two-year-old data was useless by the time it was finally delivered to me. Others have encountered similar delays and obstruction from USCIS. As of today, the best I-526 data we have is mostly thanks to IIUSA communicating with the now-retired Charles Oppenheim at Department of State, and goes through 2021. I hope for more transparency from USCIS in 2023!)

Form I-526 and I-526E

We get another chance to provide feedback to USCIS on the revised Form I-526 and I-526E, with comments due by January 23, 2023. The last round of comments successfully convinced USCIS that it’s unreasonable to demand that petitioners detail 40 years of employment history (the current proposed version asks for 20 years of employment history). Perhaps this time we can get through to USCIS what “substantive authority” means, such that USCIS doesn’t misidentify “persons involved.” Also, let’s all remind USCIS that the public list of questions and required evidence on the Form I-526 should match the private list of questions and required evidence given to USCIS adjudicators. (For example, if USCIS truly holds the untenable standard that that each investor’s eligibility is contingent on the lawful source of funds for each other investor in the NCE, then the Form I-526 should reflect that standard, and request lawful source of funds documentation for NCE investors other than the petitioner. Currently, the Form I-526 does not request any non-petitioner source of funds evidence. But USCIS has directed adjudicators to request it at the RFE stage, and to deny direct I-526 for lack of source-of-funds documentation for non-EB-5 investors.)

Form I-956K Promoter Registration

USCIS has published Form I-956K, Registration for Direct and Third-Party Promoters. The purpose of the form is “to register with USCIS as a direct or third-party promoter” and to “allow DHS to perform standard background checks with law enforcement agencies.” The form is exciting due to its ambiguities (with vague terms pointed out in the draft I-956K still undefined), and the dramatic consequences of getting it wrong. The I-956K instructions warn that if USCIS finds problems with I-956K, penalties can include criminal prosecution for the aspiring promoter plus denial of applications and petitions associated with the regional center, NCE, or JCE associated with that promoter. The I-956K instructions request that “a promoter should submit Form I-956K before operating on behalf of any of the specified entities or promoting any offering under the EB-5 Regional Center Program.” (See also the article “Who are ‘Promoters’ and What Requirements Apply to Them Under the EB-5 Reform and Integrity Act?” in the October 2022 Regional Center Business Journal, and the above-linked Federal Register invitation to submit I-956 comments to USCIS.)

EB-5 roller coaster continues (RC status after December 29, processing, FY2023 visas, EAGLE Act and country caps)

While my plate is full of everyday work plus hard articles that could be written, I’d like to briefly flag a few matters of critical importance for the EB-5 community. There are questions about the status of previously-approved regional centers and their investors, ongoing processing issues, and the prospect of new legislation to change everyone’s visa wait times. Before launching into details, a reminder that industry associations like IIUSA (for regional centers) and AIIA (for investors) are working on these issues, and you can join an association to help magnify your voice and interests in these volatile times.

Regional Center Status after December 29

USCIS finally published minutes from the October 14, 2022 meeting between USCIS and the plaintiffs in the Behring litigation. These minutes reveal that at least as of October, USCIS had yet to make up its mind about a few very consequential questions, and invited stakeholder feedback.

  • USCIS has not yet decided whether it will take the position that RIA requirements, such as fund administrators and audits, apply to pre-RIA projects. USCIS will consider stakeholders’ written position paper on this issue in accordance with existing channels of communication and in compliance with Section 107 of the RIA.
  • USCIS will accept input on the issue of whether the I-956G filing requirement should be deferred to December 2023 based on input from Stakeholders that much of the information is duplicative with the I-956 being filed in December 2022. Input will be provided in accordance with existing channels of communication and in compliance with Section 107 of the RIA.
  • USCIS has not determined what will happen to regional centers that choose not to file Form I-956. Specifically, it has not decided whether such regional centers will be terminated, whether they will have to file I-956H, whether they will have to file annual statements, or whether any of the RIA requirements apply to them. They will accept our written position paper on these issues in accordance with existing channels of communication and in compliance with Section 107 of the RIA.

That last bullet point is especially urgent and significant. The Form I-956 content is focused on compliance for capital raising activities, and as such not technically relevant for previously-approved regional centers that do not plan to raise new EB-5 capital going forward. But what if USCIS decides to terminate all regional centers who do not choose to raise new EB-5 funds? If USCIS starts terminating regional centers for not filing I-956 by December 29, 2022, instead of offering another status for RCs still responsibly shepherding previous EB-5 investment, then past investors in those RCs will find their immigration status in jeopardy. Under the new law, regional center termination means that good faith investors in the terminated regional center lose eligibility in 180 days unless (1) the investor’s NCE manages to switch sponsors and secure affiliation from a different still-authorized regional center (practically a fraught and expensive undertaking) or (2) the investor makes a new investment (yikes). Under the new law, regional center termination has consequences for investors at all stages in the process, including during conditional permanent residence.  The grandfathering language in the new law protects past applicants from denials based on the expiration of regional center program authorization, but not explicitly from denials based on changes resulting from new legislation. So USCIS faces judgement calls when it comes to how to treat previously-approved regional centers and their investors, and should hear our input for those judgement calls. (To review the new law provisions, see INA 203(b)(5) sections (M) and (S). And here’s the Settlement Agreement.)

The plaintiffs in the Behring litigation are coordinating response to USCIS. Their feedback will naturally reflect their interests and perspective as regional centers who do choose to file I-956 to raise new capital going forward. If you’re with an RC that does not plan to raise new capital after RIA, and concerned about protecting past investors, you should also let USCIS hear your voice and reasoning, as soon as possible. The stakes are very high. See the base of this page for links to accepted channels of communication for submitting feedback. (UPDATE: Klasko Law, counsel for several of the Behring litigation plaintiffs, has just published a detailed article on this topic.)

RIA Compliance Resources

Note that the October 2022 Regional Center Business Journal is packed with substantive and helpful articles for regional centers working with compliance under the new law, including:

  • “Checklist of Contents for Regional Center Compliance Policies and Procedures Manual Under the EB-5 Reform & Integrity Act” by the EB-5 Securities Roundtable
  • “New Job Creation and TEA Rules in the EB-5 Reform and Integrity Act of 2022 Revised and Explained” by Scott Barnhart and Adam Greene
  • “Understanding Audits & Fund Administration Under the Reform & Integrity Act” by Coleen Danaher, Bidhya Dhungel, and Mike Xenick (also a blog post)
  • “Regional Center Transactions Post-RIA: Considerations for Purchase, Sale, and/or Rentals” by Rohit Kapuria and Ronald Fieldstone
  • “EB-5 Concurrent Filing” by Simone Williams and Charles Kaufman
  • ”Who are ‘Promoters’ and What Requirements Apply to Them Under the EB-5 Reform and Integrity Act” by Catherine DeBono Holmes (also a blog post)
  • “Reserved Visa Rules, Possible Future Visa Allocation, and Recommendations” by Barnett, Oppenheim, and Lee (also a blog post)

I’m thankful for the hard work by industry. I’ve noted no significant new content on the USCIS website EB-5 pages. The EB-5 Policy Manual EB-5 Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 have not been updated yet based on the new law.

Processing and Timing Questions

I continue to update my Processing Data page with intel as I receive it on I-526 and I-829 processing. Pay attention to volume trends, and to the distribution of filing dates being adjudicated.  Since May 2022, the Investor Program Office has stabilized into a new stride of 100-140 decisions per month each for I-526 and I-829, with decisions spanning a wide range of filing dates. At that volume, it will take IPO about eight years to process the already-pending inventory of over 12,000 I-526 and over 11,000 I-829. My best guess for your personal adjudication wait is “probably less than eight additional years,” with the “how much less” depending on your filing date, whether you happen to benefit or suffer from USCIS’s major deviations from FIFO processing, how soon the new adjudicators hired this year/next year can get up to speed, and whether/when IPO gets approval to significantly increase its authorized staffing level.  No one thinks that eight years is an acceptable processing target. But regardless of goals, actual performance is constrained by staffing (which doesn’t change quickly) and by decisions about processing order (which can only improve appearances by manipulating the median, and provide faster times for some at the cost of slower times for others). IPO’s demonstrated incapacity to handle the EB-5 inventory is my top EB-5 concern.

The process for I-526 approvals getting transferred to NVC continues to be problematic. See question 16 (p. 7) of this June 2022 AILA/DOS Q&A for a process to follow if NVC has not received your approval notice and sent you a welcome letter after 60 days.

Visa operations generally are improving, though not back to normal. See the DOS October 21 Update on Worldwide Visa Operations.

FY2023 Visa Availability

Department of State has published Annual Numerical Limits for Fiscal Year 2023. Despite what the EB-5 Reform and Integrity Act said, the published FY2023 annual limit for EB-5 visas is exactly and only 7.1% of the EB limit. The report mentions no carryover of the 6,396 reserve EB-5 visas that went unused in FY2022.  I had wondered what DOS would do with a new EB-5 carryover law that contradicted another part of the INA. It appears that the conflict has not been resolved in EB-5’s favor. It’s a pity, because EB-5 will lose over 10,000 visas by FY2024 if the newly-reserved EB-5 visas both can’t be issued (because strictly restricted to post-RIA applicants who can’t reach the visa stage yet) and also can’t be carried over to the next year (as RIA had contemplated). I’ve encouraged advocates to look into this.

EAGLE Act and Country Caps

Under current law, there’s a country cap of 7% applied to each category of Employment-Based visas. The cap limits any one country to 7% of visas within that category until other countries’ demand under the 7% limit has been satisfied. (I used to assume that the 7% applied to categories as a whole, not subcategories, but Charles Oppenheim recently set me straight. In EB-5, the 7% cap applies independently within each reserve and unreserve visa class, not just to the EB-5 limit as a whole.)

Without country caps, visas within each EB category would simply get issued by priority date, oldest to youngest.

Who benefits from the country cap law, and who would benefit from changing the law to eliminate country caps and let EB visa applicants flow in FIFO order? Country caps protect visa availability for applicants from low-demand countries, while constraining applicants from high-demand countries into enormous backlogs. Big tech companies reliant on EB-2 and EB-3 don’t like country caps, which is why legislation to eliminate country caps has been proposed in Congress continuously since at least 2011. In EB-5, Chinese investors who filed I-526 before 2018 and Indian investors who filed I-526 in 2019-2021 suffer from country caps, while others largely benefit. I’ve written about country cap bills several times over the years and they never passed, but the current version (the EAGLE Act H.R.3648/S.4567) is reportedly actively in play, with a chance to get attached to FY2023 appropriations. And so I’m back with a few comments on the EB-5 effects, in case the legislation does pass.

To understand what a merely-FIFO queue for EB-5 visas would look like, it’s necessary to think about the distribution of the 80,000+ people currently queued up for an EB-5 visa (either already at the visa stage, or on the way at USCIS). The government doesn’t report this valuable intel directly, but I can guess by looking at data for I-526 filings by country and by year, and thinking about where those petitioners must be today based on what I know about petition processing, visa issuance, and the visa bulletin to date. Having estimated the distribution of applicants in today’s queue, I can further project the FY2025 distribution based on what I expect of I-526 processing and visa issuance in 2023 and 2024. I don’t have time to spell out all my thinking on this, but here’s my Excel file of data and calculations.  You’re welcome to download and play with this and apply your own assumptions. (One significant variable is attrition from denials/withdrawals/age-outs, which could reasonably turn out much higher than the value entered in my model.) My best guess is that if Congress acts soon to eliminate country caps, and if the country cap elimination takes effect in FY2025 as proposed, then it will have the following EB-5 effects.

  1. Without country caps, the wait times for China-born EB-5 applicants with pre-2022 priority dates will at least have a predictable ceiling, instead of being potentially nearly infinite as is the sad case under country caps plus reserve visas. I estimate that a majority of the Chinese backlog (at least 2016/2017 priority dates) would get visas at least by 2032.
  2. Without country caps, applicants from all countries except China with pre-2022 priority dates who don’t already have a visa by FY2025 could wait until 2032 before they can start getting visas. That estimate considers the number of Chinese applicants with pre-2018 priority dates whom I calculate will still be pre-green-card by 2025 (further considering newly-restricted unreserved visa availability and pending rest-of-world demand).  Based on processing trends and factors observable so far, I expect that a significant number of non-Chinese who filed I-526 in 2019-2022 will not have received a visa yet by October 2024 due to slow processing, and thus impacted by country cap removal.
  3. Without country cap limits/projections, people filing I-526 or I-526E after 2022 would be advised to invest exclusively in one of the new reserve visa categories (since the unreserved category will be entirely absorbed by the oldest Chinese applicants if unconstrained by country caps). With country caps, on the other hand, new petitioners from some countries other than China and India might be advised to invest outside a TEA to qualify for an unreserved visa, since 7% of 68% is a lot more visas available than 7% of 20%, 7% of 10%, or 7% of 2%.
  4. Without country caps to hold back and distribute demand, EB-5 categories will quickly become not-current across the board in the visa bulletin.

People are often surprised that applicants who started the EB-5 process years ago remain vulnerable to changing rules and conditions for visa availability. This is true because of when visas get allocated. Filing I-526 does not lock in access to a visa. Petition approval does not lock in access to a visa. The law and conditions that determine the EB-5 visa allocated are those that pertain at the time the visa is allocated — a time years after investment under current processing conditions. For EB-5 to become a stable program, that needs to change. We need more predictability at the time of investment/I-526 filing about the availability and even existence of the visa that incentivized the investment. The U.S. government should want to avoid bait-and-switch.

Country cap removal keeps being pushed in Congress because Employment-Based visas have a live issue — painful backlogs. So long as country cap victims are suffering in decade and multi-decade long queues, country cap beneficiaries cannot expect to rest easy in an unchallenged status quo. Until backlog problems resolve, we can expect to see civil wars over the insufficient few visas available. I would love to see the U.S. government supply EB-5 visa numbers sufficient to reward the investment-fueled U.S. job creation that already occurred based on the promise of such visas. That would be only fair. As things stand, the United States has raised and benefited from about 15 billion dollars in EB-5 investment over and above what it can justify based on current EB-5 visa number limits.

I-526, I-829, and I-485 Processing (FY2022 Q3 report and leaked data)

Last week, USCIS updated the Immigration and Citizenship Data page with reports for FY2022 Q3 (April to June 2022). I collected EB-5-specific data from the All Forms and I-485 reports, summarized below, and created charts to place the reports in context.

FY2022 Q3 Performance Data Report Excerpt

FormDescriptionReceivedApprovedDeniedTotal CompletedPending at period endProcessing Time (months)
I-526Immigrant Petition by Alien Investor3226419145512,98843.8
I-829Petition by Investor to Remove Conditions2003404938911,52348.1
I-485I-485 at the California Service Center (WSC)1,396372544265,323

Points I notice in the Q3 data report:

  • USCIS has not yet started reporting data for the new EB-5 forms (the I-956s or I-526E). The report does include the pending I-924 (139) and I-924A (1,813) that may not ever be adjudicated.
  • Q3 saw over a thousand I-485 receipts at California Service Center, but only a few dozen I-526 receipts. I’m not surprised, considering that Q3 was the first quarter under the EB-5 Reform and Integrity Act.
  • Q3 completion rates for I-526, I-829, and I-485 were all much higher than the previous quarter (an encouraging trend), and still very low in context of historical performance and the backlog (a notable fact). Significant room for improvement remains, as illustrated in the long-term trend charts provided below.
  • Dividing “Pending at period end” by “Total completed” for each form, we can derive a processing time estimate that will apply to a petition at the end of each queue if USCIS continues the same productivity it achieved in Q3. Result: 7.1 years for I-526, 3.1 years for I-485, and 7.4 years for I-829. We need to keep pressing USCIS to increase processing volume going forward, to avoid that unacceptable result. (When I redo the calculation using trailing 12-month completions in the denominator rather than just Q3 completions, then the result stays at 7 years for I-829 but increases to 13 years for I-526 and 6 years for I-485. Yikes! We now know that in 2021/2022, the Investor Program Office lost a large number of its productive staff and kept less productive staff. That’s a problem that that doesn’t solve quickly. I was encouraged to see a few more IPO job announcements this month, and look forward to seeing some results from their work in 2023/24 once they’re hired and trained.)
  • The Processing Time column in the USCIS report indicates the median processing time of cases decided in the reported quarter.  I tend to disregard this number because it’s (1) not predictive (simply reflects one point of past performance) and (2) not generally applicable even to past performance (the processing time range behind this median is extremely wide, as further discussed below).
  • The I-526 denial rate remains alarming: 42% of I-526 decisions in April to June 2022 were denials. The large number of denials reflects attitudes at the Investor Program Office, particularly toward direct EB-5 cases, and particularly since the EB-5 Reform and Integrity Act protected USCIS from judicial review of unjust EB-5 decisions. (During the RC program lapse, a majority of the reported “denied” I-526 were actually just withdrawn I-526, but the Q3 denials are largely denials.) Litigators, is there anything we can do about systemic adjudication problems behind mass denials, or do petitioners really just have to fight battles individually in the sluggish AAO process?

As an aside, note that USCIS is making what might be a good faith effort to improve case processing reporting, and solicits public input. Here is a copy of an email I received yesterday from USCIS, inviting people who have filed a form with USCIS in the past 12 months (or their advocates) to apply for participation in a focus group. This group will help USCIS “understand if the information provided on the Check Case Processing Times webpage is useful.” Consider applying to participate! It’s always possible that the current Check Case Processing Times page isn’t the way it is out of malice. Maybe USCIS would truly like to design a page that’s useful to applicants wanting to understand processing times, not only useful to USCIS for the purposes of obscuring processing trends and blocking case inquiries.  

USCIS data reports show the total size of the EB-5 form workload, and the rate at which USCIS is working on it. USCIS does not officially give visibility into which dates they are actively processing, and which they are leaving behind. For that, we have to consult anecdotal evidence and leaks. I’m not saying where I got the detail reported in the following charts, but I judge that the detail is accurate and close to complete. As illustrated in the charts, the Investor Program Office is far from implementing a first-come-first-served process. This complicates time estimates for individual cases.

Points I note from the unofficial data.

  • Over the past year, I-829 processing has generally clustered around petitions filed in 2019, but also included many I-829 filed in 2017 and 2018, and a few filed as early as 2015 and as late as 2021. I do not know the reasons for departing from FIFO discipline in I-829 adjudications. Is there an element of randomness in case assignment resulting from paper files and lax management? Is USCIS trying to group I-829 from different filing dates by project, to process the project all at once? Are expedite approvals and mandamus actions having a significant impact? Are certain groups of I-829 intentionally left untouched or taking years of touch time for reasons related to policy or litigation? If anyone would like to leak reasons to me, please reach out on email, phone, or Telegram.
  • I-526 processing has ranged broadly over the past year. Recent I-526 approvals have settled into a sort of cluster on I-526 filed in December 2018, but also covered many cases from the end of 2019 (probably mostly direct investor petitions assigned during the RC program shutdown), I-526 filed in 2021/22 (probably mostly I-526 with expedites granted – or possibly cherry-picked to make the median processing time report look better) and a wide range of I-526 filed before 2018 (selected out of the unadjudicated backlog for unknown reasons, and incidentally convenient for making the 80th percentile case inquiry cut-off more restrictive). My charts highlight timing for I-526 approvals and RFEs. The denial picture is more murky, since USCIS mixes denials and withdrawals, but I note generally that denied petitions tend to be older than approved petitions. The data supports a reasonable hypothesis: that the longer an I-526 stays unadjudicated, the more likely it is to end in denial or withdrawal.
  • USCIS has cleared close to 100% of I-526 filed up through September 2015 (the end of the last long-term RC program authorization), but still has a significant pending inventory of untouched I-526 from every quarter since then. The visa availability approach can explain about half of these left-behind I-526. As a reminder, you can find the most recent breakdown of total pending I-526 by country of petitioner origin in the March 2022 Oppenheim presentation for IIUSA (slide 8). This PDF from October 2018 was the last detailed per-country inventory breakdown published by USCIS. My information for I-829 is less complete, so I did not attempt a detailed I-829 inventory breakdown.

Facing FY2023, Suggested Articles, October 2022 Visa Bulletin

Today marks the end of Fiscal Year 2022, and the first September since 2015 that I haven’t spent reporting on Congressional news and the appropriations process, waiting with bated breath for updates about regional center program authorization.

Thanks to the EB-5 Reform and Integrity Act of 2022, we now have until September 30, 2027 to panic about legislation to reauthorize the regional center program. EB-5 is stable today in the sense that it neither requires nor anticipates near-term legislative action.

My dream for the future is that EB-5 will also stabilize in the sense of offering a reliable opportunity to immigrate based on investment. In this dream, investor petitions will be processed. Policy will be written. Adjudications will be based on transparent standards, and will have a predictable timeline. Visa availability will be transparent and predictable. Investors who satisfy all the requirements will get a chance to immigrate before they age out, give up, or die. An investment will be an investment, not an unpredictable series of deployments. Escrow protection will be possible. Regional centers will know where their status and responsibilities begin and end. EB-5 issuers will be constrained to make offerings that can and do bear scrutiny as investments. Reasonable exit strategies will be expected and possible. The experience of existing investors will influence a regional center’s ability to attract new investment. Good actors will be empowered to plan well based on good information about the immigration process and success factors. Bad actors will not flourish in impunity underwritten by long processing queue times, policy uncertainty, misdirected adjudication, and lack of communication from USCIS. Both the government and stakeholders will put stock in what happens after investors make investments and file petitions. We’re partway there, and with so much scope for improvement going forward.

To the extent that words can help, I hope and plan to bring out articles on FY2023 visa availability and reserved visas implementation, the scope of exemplar approval, denial factors and issues for attention in IPO adjudications, questions about regional center and investor status after December 29, China timing factors, India timing factors, market size potential and constraints, issues and questions in new forms, and changing project success factors in the wake of the new law. In the meantime, I’ll suggest a reading list of articles from other sources, followed by a comment on the October 2022 visa bulletin.

Reading list:

  • Fiscal Year 2023 Employment-Based Adjustment of Status FAQs” (09/08/2022) at USCIS.gov. A detailed and informative Q&A from USCIS about the specific processes involved in employment-based visa allocation. Predicts the number of FY2023 EB visas available, settles a question about EB-5 visa carryover, and offers valuable practical tips for I-485.
  • Reserved Visa Rules, Possible Future Visa Allocation, and Recommendations” (09/09/2022) on the IIUSA blog. Written by Joseph Barnett and Lee Li in consultation with Charles Oppenheim, this article provides clear and updated analysis on reserved visas. The article revised my understanding, particularly with respect to how reserves interact with country caps. Once I get feedback from the authors on a couple points, I’ll publish a revision to my article from April.
  • IIUSA Questions and Comments for October 19, 2022, EB-5 Stakeholder Engagement (09/16/2022) IIUSA did nice work in articulating many pain points in IPO operations, pointing out why the problems are problems, and suggesting feasible solutions. Now that someone has done all the work to write out these good comments, let’s all read them and amplify them with repetition. (Also FYI, here are the comments I submitted to USCIS, focused on my top concerns of transparency, and the status of pre-RIA regional centers and investors.)
  • IIUSA Teams Up with Kurzban Kurzban Tetzeli & Pratt to Seek USCIS Records on EB-5 Source of Funds Adjudications (9/7/2022) on the IIUSA blog. This article reports on one step in a very important battle: taking on the new USCIS practice of denying I-829 over source and path of funds that were approved at the I-526 stage. I’m glad to see this critical issue getting attention and action.
  • How long must you keep EB-5 capital at risk? (9/27/2022) in EB5 Investors Magazine. Robert Divine explains how the EB-5 Reform and Integrity Act changed the EB-5 sustainment period, and the consequences for new investors and redeployment. This is game-changing good news, if USCIS also sees what Robert sees in the law. Another point worth amplifying.

I considered writing an article about the October 2022 Visa Bulletin, discussing what it means for demand to “materialize,” as the visa bulletin notes like to say. Also, pointing out which applicants the visa office accounts for in setting monthly visa bulletin dates, which applicants (by contrast) we need to account for in estimating visa wait times, and what all that means for predicting future action dates. But instead, I made a picture. I hope that just looking at this image can help conceptually.  After examining the picture, you may want to consult this presentation and my data summary for most recent available estimates of the number of applicants hidden in the EB-5 process clouds (not yet on the Visa Control radar, but important for us because determinative for future visa bulletins). And then if you still really wish you had an article about the Visa Office perspective behind visa traffic control, I recommend Note F in the November 2021 Visa Bulletin, this article, and the Chat with Charlie for the April 2021 visa bulletin.

Factors and Trends Underlying I-526 Processing Times

While everyone buzzes about when I-526E can be filed with USCIS (a key point in the proposed Settlement Agreement for the Behring litigation), I consider another critical issue: when I-526/I-526E can be reviewed and approved by USCIS. The processing time topic should concern everyone who wants immigrant investment to possibly result in immigration.

I’ve noted that “about two years” has long been a favorite guess to answer the question “How long does I-526 take?” Actual estimates are tough, and the two-year guess looks relatively tolerable (still longer than I-526 should take, but about the outside limit of how long most EB-5 project developers and investors can imagine waiting in limbo). The guess was also justifiable as an estimate through about 2018, but now quite unmoored from observable processing factors.

Processing times naturally result from the size of the I-526 inventory, the quantity and productivity of resources assigned to I-526 adjudication, and the order of I-526 adjudication. I’ve carefully assembled below a table highlighting data to help ground thinking about these factors.

Consider: back in 2018, the median age of completed I-526 was 18 months. From 2018 to Summer 2022, the number of adjudicators assigned to I-526 fell by 61%. In the most recent officially-reported quarter (January to March 2022), IPO completed 24x fewer I-526 than in the same period in 2018. IPO has over 13,000 I-526 pending today, and has not processed more than 400 I-526 a month since 2018, and not more than 200 I-526 per month since July 2021. How far does that put us from expecting two-year I-526 processing times?

When one collects fees for a service, spends the fees, and then does not deliver the service or even allocate resources to provide the service, that’s generally called fraud. Today, $49 million of spilt I-526 filing fees call from the ground, asking why the United States government has assigned only 26 I-526 adjudicators to handle an inventory of over 13,000 pending investor petitions, offers excuses rather than improvement plans for falling IPO adjudicator productivity, and manages I-526 inventory by defining a large percentage of the inventory as ineligible for processing (via the “visa availability approach”).

People in government and industry who want to pave the way for future EB-5 investment and more I-526 (I-526E) filings must look at processing factors as of today. Witness how conditions have deteriorated since 2018, back when we thought two-year I-526 processing times were long. Consider how much needs to change going forward to allow for the “timely processing” of under a year that Congress wants to see for EB-5 forms according to the EB-5 Reform and Integrity Act of 2022. (Tables can look boring, but persevere. This table highlights significant detail worth thinking about. I have also created a new Processing Data page to house trend charts.)

 201820202022Source
Number of I-526 pending as of March 3120,45516,63313,385A. USCIS Immigration & Citizenship Data page reports
Number of I-526 completed in the quarter ended March 313,615904152B. USCIS Immigration & Citizenship Data page reports
Average I-526 completions per working day in the quarter ended March 3159152C=B/61
Approximate number of IPO employees as of March200245177D. USCIS reports in stakeholder meeting notes, Congressional testimony, and/or litigation declarations
Number of employees gained or lost by IPO during the previous 2-year period45(68)E is calculated from D
Number of IPO employees assigned to I-526675626F. USCIS reports in stakeholder meeting notes, Congressional testimony, and/or litigation declarations
Percent of IPO employees assigned to I-526 adjudication34%23%15%G=D/F
Percent change to IPO’s number of adjudicators assigned to I-526 2018-2022-61%H is calculated from F
Average I-526 completions per I-526 adjudicator in the quarter ended March 31546I=B/F
Percent change to IPO’s productivity per I-526 adjudicator 2018-2022-89%J is calculated from I
Estimated time (months) to process all I-526 pending as of March 31, assuming that the rate of completion from the most recent quarter continues going forward1755264K=A/B*3
Median processing time (months) of I-526 completions in this fiscal year183144L. USCIS “Historical Average Processing Time Report
Approximate number of I-526 pending as of March from China-born petitioners8,6004,900M. Estimated from USCIS report for 10/2018; DOS report for 11/2021
Approximate number of  pending I-526 with visas available8,485N=A-M
Number of I-526 expedite requests granted by USCIS9367 (to date)O. USCIS report in declaration for litigation
Theoretical hours of “Touch time” per I-526 reported by USCIS and used by DHS as a basis to budget for needed I-526 fee revenue8.65P.  2019 DHS Fee Rule
Actual “touch time” hours per I-526 adjudication calculated from completions per I-526 adjudicator in the quarter ended March 319.083.5Q=(61 days*8 hours day)/Row I
I-526 filing fees associated with pending I-526 ($ millions)$75$61$49R=A*$3,675
Percent of I-526 decisions in the quarter ended March 31 that were denials or withdrawals (not approvals)9%21%67%S. USCIS Immigration & Citizenship Data page reports

Considering the factors summarized above, an individual I-526 or I-526E filed today may avoid an unthinkably long processing time if (1) IPO dramatically increases the amount and productivity of I-526 adjudication resources and/or (2) IPO implements exceptions to the nominally First-Come-First-Served order that benefit that particular I-526, or (3) that particular I-526 or a massive number of other petitioners give up and drop out of the process. Addressing adjudication resources is the best and toughest solution. I have noted no IPO adjudicator job announcements yet this year at USAjobs.gov (only five openings for management staff) — UPDATE: but a reader informs me that there was an IPO adjudicator job announcement that closed recently. If and when USCIS hires more staff for EB-5, it takes an average 241 days to move a new USCIS adjudicator from hiring decision to completion of basic training, according to the CIS Ombudsman. IPO has not explained why it has assigned only 15% of its employees to adjudicate the Form that accounts for more than 50% of its fee-paid workload, or whether that allocation decision is open to change. To compensate for resource problems, IPO has fiddled with processing order, implementing multiple queues and a visa availability approach that effectively excludes thousands of I-526 from the processing workload. Petitioners have fought to become exceptions to the dreadful processing average by means of expedite requests and Mandamus litigation. And the new EB-5 law encourages special priority for new I-526 associated with rural projects.

The longer I-526 resource problems remain unresolved, the more IPO will face political and industry pressure to adjust processing order, pushing some subset of pending I-526 forward by pushing the other subset of pending I-526 backward.  If the entire system cannot be improved with sufficient resources to provide reasonable processing for everyone, then pressure will build to improve processing times inequitably for at least a few constituents. I do not want to see I-526 processing replicating the cynical tragedy already in place at the visa stage, where “reserved visas” offer to fast-track new applicants by excluding and displacing backlogged applicants. USCIS must address I-526 resources to avoid resorting to processing inequalities and broad-based damage.

I particularly highlight I-526 processing and backlog issues, because I-526 processing is the engine for the entire EB-5 immigration process. But I-526 problems are not unique. USCIS as a whole is laboring under resource and backlog challenges. Current DHS and USCIS leadership recognize and deplore the agency-wide problems, which is encouraging. Their sympathetic attention illuminates the magnitude and the systemic nature of problems, which is useful but less encouraging.  In recent statements, webinars, and reports on processing conditions across USCIS, I hear principled commitment to improve more than practical hope for broad-based change any time soon. This shapes my expectations for improvement EB-5 processing – a small part of the total immigration system.  

My expectations for processing improvements must also consider mixed incentives even among EB-5 stakeholders. Who is willing to take the first step toward affecting change — identifying and discussing EB-5 processing problems — when the problems look discouraging? Who needs to care if a protracted EB-5 process increases the time to hold EB-5 funds under management and defers government oversight? Who needs to think about what happens after investors file I-526 or I-526E, when most incentives for service providers, projects, and regional centers come before petition filing? Among those motivated to care about immigration outcomes, how many will slog through articles like this instead of clinging to hopeful guesses? Here’s a gauntlet. Let’s see our industry warriors, fresh from successful I-956 battles, take up the fight to salvage processing conditions for investor petitions.

For further insight into the context of EB-5 processing, I recommend the CIS Ombudsman 2022 Annual Report to Congress. “This year’s Report examines the ‘snowball effects’ and pain points associated with backlogs and recommends actions USCIS can take to address not only the human consequences suffered by applicants, families, and employers but also the detrimental impacts on the agency … This article examines how the agency arrived at the crisis of backlogs which is now threatening to overwhelm it and highlights some of the steps it is taking to overcome this challenge.” A really excellent report: thoughtful, substantial, and sympathetic. EB-5 stakeholders should note the insightful analysis of resource constraints (not EB-5-specific, but applicable), and the detailed discussion of the EAD and Advance Parole processes and the expedite process. Regarding parallel issues with Department of State and consular processing, see the study Mounting Backlogs Undermine U.S. Immigration System and Impede Biden Policy Changes (February 23, 2022) by the Migration Policy Institute. See also U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services: Actions Needed to Address Pending Caseload by the Government Accountability Office (August 18, 2021).